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In the Cordwainers' Case' which formulated the conspiracy
doctrine in order to repress the "unlawful combination" of American
workers at the beginning of the previous century, the judge predicated
his instructions to the jury, in part, upon the existence of serious and
severe penalties to which employees would be subjected if a labor
organization were able to form and exert economic pressure.2 Of
course the conspiracy doctrine and-to a much lesser extent-its next
of kin, the labor injunction3 and anti-trust law, ' have disappeared
t This article is an extension of a paper delivered at the Seventeenth Annual Institute on
Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation at Dallas, Texas, on October 15, 1970. The
Proceedings of the Institute were published by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., copyright 01971;
this article is published with their permission. The author is indebted to Richard Goodman of
the Class of 1971 of Wayne State University Law School for research assistance rendered in the
preparation of this article. My discussions with Jerome Brooks, Regional Director for the
Seventh Region of the National Labor Relations Board, Bernard Gottfried, Regional Attorney
for the Seventh Region of the National Labor Relations Board, and my colleague, Professor
Robert Berry, have all stimulated me to think further on the issues involved in this paper. Of
course, the analysis and conclusions of this article are solely those of the author.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University; Member of National Academy of Arbitrators.
B.A. 1958, University of Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell University; Graduate Study 196263, London School of Economics. The author was Counsel for the Charging Party in Local 205,
Lithographers and Photoengravers Union, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Nov. 9, 1970).
I. Commonwealth v. Pullis, Philadelphia Mayor's Court (1806), reprintedin 3 J. COMMONS,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (2d ed. 1910).
2. Id.
3. The labor injunction has been revived under federal labor contract law. See Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For differing views on the issue involved in Boys
Markets, compare Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and
Philadelphia Marine on the Fabricof National Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. Rv.980 (1969),
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from the industrial relations scene; trade union strength has increased,
and the growth of labor organizations has been fostered by national
labor policy. 5 But the law of union discipline under the National
Labor Relations ActA--as distinguished from precedent under the
Landrum-Griffin Act7 and state law-is of fairly recent vintage.
In enacting the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress restricted various
aspects of union disciplinary authority, emphasizing procedural
safeguards for individual union members8 and protection against
with Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions and the Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup.
CT. REV. 215 (1970).
4. Consideratons of anti-trust law are now a substantial factor in labor law. See United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969),
rev'd 39 U.S.L.W. 4245 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971).
5. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 1,49 Stat. 449-50, provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise of workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.
See generally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATiONAL LABOR POLICY (1960); H. WELLINGTON,
LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 1-46 (1968); Magruder, A Halt Century of Legal Influence
Upon.theDevelopment of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1071 (1937).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as NLRA].
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970) [hereinafter referred to as
LMRDA]. See generally Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960); Cox, Landrum-Grlffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Smith, The Labor-ManagementReporting
and DisclosureAct of 1959,46 VA. L. REV. 195 (1960).
8. See Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free Speech andAssembly: Institutional
Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REV. 403 (1967); Etelson & Smith, Union
Discipline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1969). Leading discussions
of the law on internal union relations prior to Landrum-Griffin include D. BoK a J. DUNLOP,
LABOR AND THE AMERICAiq COMMUNITY

64-137 (1970); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of

Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REV. 993 (1930); Cox, The Role of Law In Preserving
Union Democracy, 72 HAPV. L. REV. 609 (1959); Hanslowe, Individual Rights In Collective
Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Summers-Legal Limitations];
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175
(1960); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a
FederalSystem, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).

On comparable law and practice in Britain, see J. GRODIN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND THE
LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN EXERIENCES (1961); C. GRUNFELD, MODERN TRADE UNION
LAW 176-95 (1966); R.W. RIDEOUT, THE RIGHT TO MEMBERSHIP OF A TRADE UNION (1963);
ROYAL COMMSSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEPS' ASSOCIATIONS

1965-1968, C.M.N.D.

No. 3623, at 160-78 (1968); Kahn-Freund, Trade Unions. The Law and Society, 33 MoD. L.
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retaliation for the exercise of certain rights including participation in

the union's political process, 9 freedom of speech and assembly, 0 and
the right to use the courts without interference." However, the

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the principal statute
governing the union-employer relationship, is more complex and,
moreover, potentially far-reaching. Permeating its statutory scheme is

the principle that a union which has the support of a majority of the
workers is the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees,

both union and non-union. 12 This rule is qualified both by the
statutory proviso which permits workers to present grievances in their
individual capacity in some circumstances 13 and by the judicially-

enunciated doctrine of the duty of fair representation, the obligation
of a union to provide fair and non-discriminatory representation for

all workers on whose behalf it bargains."
Given this backdrop for the controversy surrounding union

discipline under the NLRA, it is instructive to examine the particular
REv. 241 (1970). The Conservative Government proposes to change some aspects of existing
law. See Industrial Relations Bill: Consultative Document (U.K. Dept. of Employment and
Productivity, Oct. 5, 1970); Industrial Relations Bill (Bill 60, Dec. 1, 1970); Gould, Unions on a
Legal Leash. The Guardian Weekly (Manchester), Jan. 23, 1971, at 7, col. 1; Address of
Solicitor General, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., to Industrial Law Society, in London, Nov. 21,
1970 (unpublished paper on file at Wayne State University Law Library). Some of the thinking
behind such proposals has been discussed in general terms for a number of years. See A New
Lawfor Trade Unions? Some Proposalsfor Reform, THE ECONOMIST (London), Feb. 8, 1964,
at 482, col. 1; An IndustrialPeaceBoard?,THE ECONOMIST (London), Oct. 6, 1962, at 21, col.
i.
9. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(l) (1964).
10. LMRDA § 101(a)(2),29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1964).
11. LMRDA § 101(a)(4),29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1964).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964). See also J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944);
Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining,45 COLUM. L. REv. 556 (1945). For a
discussion of the relationship of these principles to other portions of the NLRA, see Meltzer,
OrganizationalPicketingand the NLRB: Fiveon a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 78 (1962).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). See Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale Union, 173 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 & n.7 (1965);
Broniman v. Great AtI. and Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1965); Black-Clawson Co. v.
IAM Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
14. See Steele v. Louisville &N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), where the Court promulgated this
doctrine under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,
1970). See also Czaosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 210 (1949);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Metal Workers, Local 1, 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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statutory provisions in question. On the one hand, section 8(b)(1)
forbids union restraint and coercion of "employees . . . in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 or [of]. . . an employer in
the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances."' 15 At the same time,
Congress qualified the first portion of this statutory provision,
subsection (A), with the proviso that "this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. .. .,
These seemingly contrary provisions have helped to spawn
considerable litigation concerning the interpretation of section 8(b)(1)
and, accordingly, have made prophetic a frequently quoted
observation of Professor Cox:
The scope and the variety of the. . . problems suggest that Section 8(b)(1)
may plunge the Board into a dismal swamp of uncertainty. Its vagueness alone,
not to mention the broad interpretations put upon it during the debates in
Congress, encourages the filing of great numbers of charges as weapons in
fighting the unionization of a plant. A long period of uncertainty and heavy
volume of litigation will be necessary before the questions of interpretation can
17
be resolved.

Although the Supreme Court has said that section 8(b)(1) was
intended to place the same restrictions upon unions as the NLRA
imposed upon employers concerning violations of employee rights,"8

another of its holdings indicated that the breadth of the employer's
obligation exceeds that which the statute imposes upon unions." At
the same time, the Court has advised that the protection of a worker's
employment status from unlawful interference is the central concern
of the NLRA.2 Yet only three years ago, in NLRB v. AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co._2 was the Court first called upon to
15. NLRA § 8(b)(I)(A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(A)-(B) (1964).
16. NLRA § 8(b)(I)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964).
17. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,61 HARv. L. REv. I,

33 (1947).
18. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,738 (1961).
19. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639,362 U.S. 274,290 (1960).
20. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). "The policy of the Act is to
insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights." Id. at 40.
21. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). Prior to Allis-Chalmers, it was clear that a union and employer
acted unlawfully when they adversely affected a worker's employment status because of
"misbehavior" prompting internal union discipline. See, e.g., NLRB v. International

Longshoremen's &Warehousemen's Union, 75 L.R.R.M. 2044 (9th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Bell
Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953). See also H.R. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess.
41 (1947); S. REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947).
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determine the effect of the NLRA on union disciplinary problems
not directly altering employment conditions. A train of seemingly
unending litigation has followed in the wake of that decision.
In Allis-Chalmers the employees, represented by locals of the
United Automobile Workers, were engaged in "lawful economic
strikes" in support of new contract demands. Conducted in
compliance with the UAW constitution, the strikes were called with
the approval of the International Union after at least two-thirds of the
members of each local had voted by secret ballot to strike. During the
strikes, some members of each local crossed the picket lines and
worked. After the strikes were over, the locals brought disciplinary
proceedings against such members, charging them with violations of
the International constitution and by-laws. The trials, conducted by
local trial committees in proceedings against which no claims of
unfairness were made, each resulted in a finding that each charged
member was guilty of "conduct unbecoming a union member" and
should be fined in sums ranging from $20 to $100. When the members
failed to pay the fines, the union sought court enforcement.
In response, Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges
with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A). The Board held that the union had not engaged in
an unfair labor practice because any restraint or coercion resulting
from a union fine was exempted from the statutory prohibitions by
the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). After initially approving the
Board's decision, 22 the court of appeals, upon rehearing en banc,
found a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A), with three judges dissenting.2
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found no violation. Writing
for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan said that it was "highly
unrealistic" to hold that the words "restrain or coerce" contained in
section 8(b)(1)(A) "precisely and unambiguously [cover] the union
conduct involved in this case. ' 24 He explained:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the
majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of
bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The
policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
22. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1965).
23. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
24. 388 U.S. at 179.
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relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen

representative to act in the interests of all employees.2

Noting that the principle of majority rule and the doctrine of
exclusive bargaining representation incorporated in the National
Labor Relations Act had prompted the fashioning of the duty of fair
representation for employee protection against the union 26and had
encouraged Congress to pass the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments,21 the Court in Allis-Chalmers reasoned that the right of
unions to discipline their members was a logical corollary to this
statutory scheme:
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to

protect against erosion its status under that policy through a reasonable
discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing

membership. That power is particularly vital when the members engage in
strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in

labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms. ....

28

The Court found that the legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(A)
evidenced a congressional intent to stay clear of internal union affairs,
basing its conclusion in part upon the "cogent support" in the proviso
to that section . 2 But, unlike the Board, the Court found it
unnecessary to determine whether the proviso protected the union
imposition of fines. However, the Court noted that although the
proviso spoke literally of the retention and acquisition of
"membership," it would be "anomalous" to articulate a distinction
between court enforcement of union fines and enforcement by
expulsion. First, said the Court, since Congress was operating under
the "contract theory" of the union-member relationship, a law suit
could be viewed as the ordinary way through which performance of
private money obligations would be compelled. Further, the Court
noted that "such a distinction would visit upon the member of a
strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court
enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the
weak union by requiring it either to condone this conduct or to deplete
its ranks."30 Thus, although the Court avoided specifically ruling on
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 180.
Id. at 180-81. See also note 14 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
388 U.S. at 181.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
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the impact of the proviso, its reasoning seemed proximate to that
employed by the Board.
The majority opinion, however, contains language which strongly
indicates that some forms of internal union regulations may violate
the NLRA. The Court stressed the fact that the fined employees
"enjoyed full union membership" and that each worker had executed
a pledge of allegiance to the UAW constitution and had taken the
"oath of full membership." 31 Moreover, said the Court, each of the
disciplined employees had "fully participated in the proceedings
leading to the strike"3 2 through attendance at meetings at which a
secret strike vote and a "renewed" strike vote were taken. Thus, the
Court noted, "[w]hether § 8(b)(1)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition
of fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader, are
matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express no
view." 33 Finally, the Court noted the absence of any contention that
the fines were not "reasonable."4
As if to emphasize the tentative nature of the Court's holding, Mr.
Justice White's separate concurring opinion stated that he was
"doubtful about the implications of some of [the majority opinion's]
generalized statements." a Said Justice White:
I do not mean to indicate, and I do not read the majority opinion otherwise,
that every conceivable internal union rule which impinges upon the § 7 rights
of union members is valid and enforceable by expulsion and court action. There
may well be some internal union rules which on their face are wholly invalid
and unenforceable.'

Writing for the dissent, Mr. Justice Black in essence stated that
the literal language of section 8(b)(1)(A) must be adhered to in the
absence of persuasive legislative history to the contrary. 3 Moreover,
he contended, the Court-without saying so-was compelling a union
member to waive his section 7 right to refrain from participating in
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 192-93 n.30.
Id. at 199. All of the dissenters-Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart-remain

on the Court. Justices Brennan and White are the only members of the majority still on the

bench; Justices Fortas and Clark and Chief Justice Warren have been replaced by Justices
Blackman and Marshall and Chief Justice Burger; cf. St. Antoine, Judicial Valour and the

Warren Court's Decisions, 67 Mxcii. L. REv. 317 (1968).
36. 388 U.S. at 198.
37. Id. at 217.
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concerted activity 38 and was engaging in a policy judgment by
attempting to prop up "weak" unions and to provide them with the
power to impose fines enforceable in court. He argued that
[ilt is one thing to say that Congress did not wish to interfere with the union's

power, similar to that of any other kind- of voluntary association, to prescribe
specific conditions of membership. It is quite another thing to say that
Congress intended to leave unions free to exercise a courtlike power to try and
punish members with a direct economic sanction for exercising their right to
work. Just because a union might be free, under the proviso, to expel a member
for crossing a picket line does not mean that Congress left the unions free to
threaten their members with fines. Even though a member may later discover
that the threatened fine is only enforceable by expulsion, and in that sense a
"lesser penalty," the direct threat of a fine, to a member normally unaware of
the method the union might resort to for compelling its payment, would often
be more coercive than a threat of expulsion.3

Finally, in response to the Court's suggestion that a converse result
was implausible inasmuch as Congress could then be said to have
preceded Landrum-Griffin with even "more pervasive regulation of
the internal affairs of unions" than was provided by that statute, Mr.
Justice Black asserted that Landrum-Griffin was not intended to limit
previously existing rights. Moreover, the dissent emphasized a factor
to which the majority seemed somewhat sensitive-the contractual
union security clause that might conceivably coerce employees into
joining in union activity.40
Following on the heels of Allis-Chalmers, two Supreme Court
decisions involving fines have shed some light on the problems that
were raised by that decision. The first was NLRB v. Industrial Union
of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers ofAmerica,4 where the Court was

confronted with the question of union discipline imposed after a
member had filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board. The member had initially alleged that the
president of his union had violated the International's constitution.
When the local union decided in favor of the president, the member
did not choose to pursue the intra-union appeals procedure required
by the International's constitution but filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging that the local union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by
38. Id. at 216-17.
39. Id. at 203.
40. As noted above, the majority opinion sought to rationalize this problem by distinguishing
between full and "not so full" members of the union. See note 31 supra and accompanying text,
41. 391 U.S.418 (1968).
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causing his employer to discriminate against him because of his
involvement in protected activity. This, in turn, led to his expulsion
from the union on the ground that he had filed a charge with the
Board before exhausting internal remedies. The union member then
filed a second charge with the Board, alleging that his expulsion for
filing the first charge was unlawful under section 8(b)(1)(A). This
second charge presented the issue which was before the Courf in the
Marine Workers case.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, noted
preliminarily that the initial charge must be assumed to be within the
"ambit of § 7" and that any question of the adequacy of the first
charge which led to the member's discipline must be resolved in his
favor. Recognizing the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) and the holding
in Allis-Chalmers, Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that "§ 8(b)(1)(A)
assures the union freedom of self-regulation where its legitimate
internal affairs are concerned. But where a union rule penalizes a
member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board
42
other considerations of public policy come into play."
Thus, the Court held that the "overriding public interest"
supported a finding of unlawful coercion unless "plainly internal
affairs of the union are involved." Since the charge in the instant
case involved not only the union but the employer as well, the Court
concluded that the issues would be difficult to explore in an internal
union proceeding. Moreover, the Court assumed that while the
Landrum-Griffin provision which provides that a member "may be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures" within a period
not to exceed four months" was applicable, it simply provided a court
with discretion to "stay its hand" while internal relief was sought.,The second case following Allis-Chalmers was Scofield v.
NLRB, 4 ' where the controversy centered on production employees
who were paid on a piecework or incentive basis. The union had
initiated a ceiling on the production for which its members would
accept immediate piecework pay. While members could produce as
much as they liked each day, they could only draw pay up to the
ceiling rate. Payments for the additional production were "banked"
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 424.
Id.
LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1964).
391 U.S. at 426.
394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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or retained by the company and paid out to the employees for days on
which the production ceiling was not reached. Although the company
would comply if the worker demanded full payment, the union
assessed a fine of $1 for each such violation and in cases of repeated
violations fined members up to $100 for "conduct unbecoming a
union member;" failure to pay the fine might lead to expulsion. While
the company had regularly urged the union to abandon the ceiling
prior to the Scofield litigation, it had never agreed to refuse workers
immediate pay for the work done over the ceiling. However, the Court
found that the "parties had bargained over the ceiling rate and the
company has extracted from the union promises to increase the ceiling
47
rate."
Characterizing the Allis-Chalmers decision as essential acceptance
of the Board's position, Mr. Justice White's majority opinion noted
that the Board's analysis of the statute "emphasizes the sanction
imposed, rather than the rule itself, and [while it] does not involve the
Board in judging the fairness or wisdom of particular union rules, it
has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding
policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or
expulsion, without violating § 8(b)(l). ' ' 48 The Court stressed the
implication in Allis-Chalmers that union members were free to leave
the union and escape the rule. Moreover, the Scofield opinion noted
that the fines were not unreasonable nor the "mere fiat" of union
leadership, that membership in the union was not involuntary, and
that unacceptable tactics such as violence or employer discrimination
had not been the means through which the rule was implemented.
Conceding that the rule had an obvious impact on the employment
relationship beyond the confines of union organization, the Court
noted that the legitimate interest indicated by the rule was a reduction
of competitive pressure and its undesirable consequences among
employees. The Court concluded:
The union rule here left the collective bargaining process unimpaired, breached

no collective contract, required no pay for unperformed services, induced no
discrimination by the employer against any class of employees, and represents
no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation. In light of this,
and the acceptable manner in which the rule was enforced, vindicating a
47. Id. at 426.
48. Id. at 429.
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legitimate union interest, it is impossible to say that it contravened any policy
of the Act. 9

In one respect, the Court's Allis-Chalmers decision did not
contradict the Board's previous interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A)
and its proviso. The Board, while avoiding interference with internal
rules in those cases where union fines were aimed at strikebreaking
and production quotas, had not hesitated to become more deeply
involved in those instances involving a threat to its own administrative
processes. The Board had found an unfair labor practice in Marine
Workers and had concluded, moreover, that a union's expulsion of a
member-as well as the levying of a fine-constituted a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A) where the sanction had been imposed because the
charging party had filed an unfair labor practice with the Board."1
Presumably, expulsion of a member is at the core of whatever
protection is afforded unions by the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) and
its caveat against interference with the acquisition and retention of
membership. But this proviso did not deter the Board where access to
its own facilities was at stake. Thus, the Board was becoming heavily
committed to an approach which was logically at odds with its notion
that fines involving internal affairs safeguarded by the proviso did not
affect employment status and were therefore beyond the concern of
the Act's framers. Then, as now, the inquiry was directed at the
legitimacy of the union's objective balanced against the means
employed to enforce that objective and the offensiveness of the
objective to public policy or law.
Even within these relatively small confines the problems have
become more complicated. The surface of the iceberg may be set forth
in the issues raised in Blackhawk Tanning Co. 52 In that case, the
49. Id. at 436. The three decisions are discussed in Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines:
The NLRA and Union Disciplinary Power, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 681 (1970); Silard, Labor
Board Regulation of Union DisciplineAfter Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers and Scofield, 38
Gao. WASH. L. REV. 187 (1969). For a discussion of Allis-Chalmers and union discipline, see
Christensen, Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in an Industrial
Democracy,43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 227, 269-79 (1968).
50. Westgate Painting & Decorating Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 75 L.R.R.M. 1465
(1970); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964); Local 283, UAW, Wisconsin Motor
Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964); Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
See also Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.
1965).
51. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679
(1964). But see Local 4028, U.S.A., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965),
affd, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
52. 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25,72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
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Board considered whether section 8(b)(1)(A) was violated when a
union fined a worker for filing a petition to decertify the union. Prior
to Blackhawk, the Board had distinguished expulsion of a member for

filing a dedertification petition from expulsion for filing an unfair
labor practice on the theory that a union could justifiably refuse to
countenance a traitor in its midst. But precedent on expulsion for
decertification activity could not necessarily be equated with union
fines, said the Board in Blackhawk-the form of a sanction could
alter the analysis and conclusions reached under section 8(b)(1)(A).
Thus, a majority of the Board concluded, section 8(b)(l)(A) was
violated where a fine rather than expulsion was employed:
The solution calls for. . . the weighing of the public policy in each situation
against the union's right to regulate its internal affairs. The rule permitting a
union to expel a member seeking its decertification is an exception to the rule
prohibiting a union from penalizing a union member because he has sought to
invoke the Board's processes. The exception is based on the necessities of the
situation, the right of the union to defend itself. It is buttressed by the fact that
the deterrent or punitive effect of expulsion in such circumstances is at most
minimal. 53

The Blackhawk decision may be instructive in a number of respects. First, it makes more vivid the perils involved where the
above-noted balancing takes place within a presumption of illegality;
for one cannot necessarily assume, as the Blackhawk majority opinion
does, that the deterrent effect of the fine is to discourage members
from seeking access to the Board where the fine is imposed in retaliation for the actual filing of the petition, rather than the potential
for so doing. There is no need for other members to go to the Board
to file petitions in the representation campaign, although it must be
conceded that employees could be deterred from filing unfair labor
practice charges arising out of the combat of the ensuing election."
The union may have a greater interest in moving against dual
unionism and the evils traditionally associated with it, a policy
53. Id., 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050. The General Counsel has applied Blackhawk to union fines

imposed because members attended the meeting of a rival union. The theory is that the penalized
worker is discouraged or deterred from utilizing Board facilities, an act which he may be on the
brink of performing. See [Apr.-Jun. 1970] NLRB GEN. COUN. Q. REP. ON CASE DEv. 4-5,
reprintedat 4 CCH'LAB. L. REP.
8087 at 13,757-17 (1970).
54. While an employee might be encouraged to withdraw an outstanding petition, the
withdrawal must be approved by the Board. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.70(a) (1970).
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which, perhaps improperly, has found favor in state court decisions
involving the enforceability of union fines.0 Perhaps the union seeks
to discourage resignation or withdrawals from the organization."
But, if this is so, the deterrent effect of the penalty may be slight. 57
I am of the view that the potential for error on the part of the
Board and the courts increases in proportion to the exacting standard
of administrative and judicial review which is imposed upon union
behavior, a behavior which is not always easily understood by the
institutions which are charged with the responsibility for adjudication. Scofield is in accord with this deferential view and therefore
indicative of the wide latitude to be accorded to a labor union in its
activities. 58 The primary reason for this approach is that the law of
union discipline shapes the balance of power between labor and management and involves an area in which American labor law does not
tread too deeply. The impact of section 8(b)(1)(A) upon union
power vis-a-vis the employer is dramatized vividly in Allis-Chalmers
where statutory interpretation may determine the union's ability to
maintain the strike. But, if one can say that a presumption exists in
favor of laissez-faire in this area, it is carefully tempered by the desire for employee free choice and other public policy considerations.
THE UNLAWFUL OBJECTIVE

Evaluation of the Board's task in dealing with the legitimacy of
union discipline under section 8(b)(1)(A) requires an understanding of
the criteria formulated in Allis-Chalmers within the framework of a
coherent national labor policy. In Allis-Chalmers, the Court-while
interpreting the NLRA-seemed to assume the applicability of
Landrum-Griffin-type standards. 59 In Marine Workers, Justice
Douglas assumed that the exhaustion requirements contained in
Landrum-Griffin were relevant to the Board's authority under the
Taft-Hartley Act. Moreover, a careful reading of Allis-Chalmers
seems to permit the articulation of a common law fashioned from the
55. See generally Summers-Legal Limitations. For some insights into the evolution of such
trade union concern, see I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS (1960).
56. See Schlossberg & Lubin, Union Fines and Union Discipline Under the N.L.R.A., May

26, 1970 (unpublished paper on file at Wayne State University Law Library).
57. See UNION SECURITY AND THE EFFECT OF Allis-Chalmers portion of text infra.

58.
racial
phrey
59.

Such an approach, incidentally, is in much the same vein as that employed in the nonduty-of-fair-representation cases. See, e.g.. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humv. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Hoffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
388 U.S. at 193-94.
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general intent of the statutes. While the Board's authority to function
in this manner is subject to considerable debate, its broad grant of
authority under section 8(b)(1) and the lack of clear statutory
standards place a heavy burden upon the agency. All this is made
more clear by the Court's emphasis in Allis-Chalmers upon the
importance of democratic procedures in connection with a member
vote. In addition, the Court cited its abhorrence to "fiat" by a union
leader, even though the basis upon which strike or ratification votes
are taken does not seem to be a proper concern of the courts under
either the Landrum-Griffin" or Taft-Hartley Acts. If a kind of
"judicial inventiveness" 6' is not required as a result of these three
cases, something very close to it is.
Thus, when the Court in Scofield quoted with approval the
Board's observation that the union had a "very real, immediate and
direct interest in" the economic measures taken to serve the group, it
was using language reminiscent of that employed by the Court in
reconciling anti-trust and labor legislation.' This suggests that just as
the Board has had to determine the lawfulness of the "most favored
nation" clause under section 8(b)(3)" where the union insists upon its
inclusion in the agreement to the point of impasse," it must make a
similar'analysis under section 8(b)(1)(A) where a union fines workers
who refuse to abide by such a bargaining tactic, the workers believing
that the tactic runs counter to their own bargaining unit's economic
interest."
60. See Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed'n of Musicians, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.
1962); Bruen v. Local 492, i.U.E., 313 F. Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1969); Britt v. Peninsula
Shipbuilders Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Ga. 1969); Fogg v. Randolph, 244 F. Supp. 885
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
61. For other references to such "judicial inventiveness" see Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); cf. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d
75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
62. See. e.g.,.Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 657, 691 (1965).
63. NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964). The section provides that "[i]t shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer .
64. N.L.R.B. v. Borg Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See also Dolly Madison Industries, 182
N.L.R.B. 147 (1970), where the Board held that a most favored nation clause-in which the
union agrees to make the employer's contractual obligations dependent upon the imposition of
similar clauses upon his competitors-is a mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning
of the Act. In addition, the Board held that an employer could insist upon such a clause in the
absence of a "predatory purpose." On the relationship between labor and anti.trust statutes see,
in particular, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,
227-37 (1940).
65. See Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion in Pennington v. United Mine Workers,
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In Scofield where the petitioner characterized the union's rule on
production quotas as "featherbedding,"

the Court exhibited

skepticism about the allegation but noted that
Congress has addressed itself specifically to the problem of featherbedding in
§ 8(b)(6), making it an unfair labor practice to "cause or attempt to cause an
employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing
of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or
not to be performed .......
... This narrow prohibition was enacted partly
because the Congress found it difficult to define with more particularity just
where the area between shiftlessness and over-work should lie. Since Congress
has addressed itself to the problem specifically and left a broad area for private
negotiation, there is no present occasion for the courts to interfere with private
decision. Indeed, there is no claim before us that the rule violates § 8(b)(6). If
the company wants to require more work of its employees, let it strike a better
bargain. The labor laws as presently drawn will not do so for it."

Mr. Justice White stated that the question whether the collective

bargaining agreement was breached was one of the factors which
would determine whether any policy of the Act had been
contravened.' 7 This, coupled with Justice Brennan's stress upon the

"lawful" and "authorized" nature of the strike in Allis-Chalmers,
means that fines imposed upon workers who refuse to participate in

stoppages which are in breach of contract are unlawful." The General
Counsel has struck down a union-imposed fine in the context of a

broad no-strike clause even where the fine was triggered by the
crossing of a picket line by individual employees who were

contractually free, under a reservation to the broad no-strike clause,
to refuse to cross the picket line-the theory being that the union is
offending its general no-strike undertaking through encouraging

refusal to cross by the employees who remained contractually free to
381 U.S. at 697. Cf. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). On the application of the
self-interest lockout cases, see NLRB v. David Friedland Painting Co., 377 F.2d 983 (3d Cir.
1967); Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965); Graham v.
Acme Markets, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1966). A fine discussion is contained in Freilicher, The
Supportive Lockout, 19 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 599 (1968). The same kinds of considerations are
involved in some aspects of the lawfulness of coordinated bargaining. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge
Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106,74 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1970); Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690
(1962); Goldberg, CoordinatedBargainingTactics of Unions, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 897 (1969).
66. 394 U.S. at 434. Similarly, the Court noted that section 8(b)(3) could not be said to have
been violated since the union had not refused to bargain about the subject matter in dispute.
67. Id. at 436.
68. National Grinding Wheel Co., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311 (1969); Tusco
Glass, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 73 L.R.R.M. 1125 (1969). Where the strike is unlawful as in
public employment, the fine should be unenforceable. Cf Dudek v. Pittsburgh City Fire
Fighters, Local No. 1,425 Pa. 233, 228 A.2d 752 (1957).
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do so. 69 Indeed, in harmonizing the interpretation to be given section
8(b)(1)(A) with the resolution of what is protected by sections 8(a)(1) 71
and 8(a)(3) 71 of the Act, the Board has accepted the Lucas Flour72 rule
and held that the fine may not be levied where the grievancearbitration machinery is broad enough to make the dispute which has
triggered the strike susceptible to arbitration. This, of course, is not
simply reconciliation of section 8(b)(1)(A) with sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3). Also involved are section 203,12 in which Congress placed its
imprimatur upon the peaceable "final adjustment" of disputes
involving the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
through procedures adopted by the parties themselves, and section
301,74 under which Congress has instructed the federal judiciary to
fashion a federal common law of labor contract.7 5 But, query, does the
absence of arbitration as the last step in the grievance machinery
under a contract containing a broad no-strike clause or arbitration
provision alter the validity of the union fine under section
69. See [Jun.-Sept. 1970] NLRB GEN. COUN. Q. REP. ON CAsE DEv., reprinted at 4 CCH
LAB. L. REP.
8097, at 13,769-75 (1970). See generally NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply
Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Carney & Florsheim, The Treatment ofRefusals to Cross Picket Lines,
"By-Paths and Indirect Crookt Ways," 55 CORNELL L. REV. 940 (1970); Comment, Picket
Line Observance: The Board and the Balance of Interest, 79 YALE L.J. 1369 (1970). In
Washington Post Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1970), the Board upheld a
fine where the contract could not be said to prohibit the strike since the refusal to cross a picket
line grew out of a dispute not covered by the grievance-arbitration machinery. See also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 75 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1970), where a fine
imposed for the refusal to cross the picket line of a sister local was upheld as well. On the application of section 301 labor injunctions to the refusal to cross another union's picket line, see
Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 75 L.R.R.M. 2475 (D.N.H. 1970).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . .
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title."
71. Id. § 158(a)(3) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by
discrimination in regard io hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
72. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
73. NLRA § 203,29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964):
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to
make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance
disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
74. NLRA § 301,29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
75. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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8(b)(1)(A)TI Probably not, one would think, since it is the exclusive
representative itself which has negotiated the contract. Even though
the absence of arbitration as a final step in the machinery might
arguably make the stoppage more justifiable, it is difficult to see why
the union should profit and the individual worker pay a price in this
situation. After all, the workers are confronted with a picket line
established in breach of contract and therefore have reason to believe
that they will be disciplined 'or discharged if they do not cross. The
dilemma for the individual worker is the imposition of sanctions by
either the union or the employer, depending upon the side of the picket
line upon which he stands.
But what of the stoppage which, while not in breach of contract,
nevertheless constitutes unprotected activity under the Act and
therefore subjects the participating employee to the kind of penalty
described above? Suppose an employee refuses to conform to a union
policy requiring refusal to work overtime. Those who adhere to union
instructions are discharged and subsequently establish a picket line to
protest management's action. Does a fine which is aimed at the
worker who crosses this kind of picket line violate section
8(b)(1)(A)? n The balancing here is considerably more difficult since
the picket line would appear to be every bit as lawful and authorized
as that set forth in Allis-Chalmers itself. Yet union policy is at odds
with the interpretation given to protected activity under sections 7 and
8 of the Act. Perhaps a kind of rough justice which would uphold the
fine against the worker on the ground that the employee benefits
through working overtime-as well as during the strike-is justified
on the same theory that a fine of a reasonable amount can be viewed
as permissible if it is a reasonable non-confiscatory union tax on
strikebreakers. On the other hand, one might apply a version of
Justice Douglas' approach to the fines involved in Marine Workers,
76. It is possible that the absence of arbitration might alter the analysis employed in the quid
pro quo context in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks, 398.U.S. 235 (1970), where it is unclear
whether an injunction can issue against a strike in breach of contract if arbitration is not the
final step in the grievance machinery. See Gould, supra note 3; St. Antoine, Interventionism,
Laissez-Faire,and Stare Decisis: The Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, October Term,
1969, Address before ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Aug. 10, 1970,74 LAB. REL. REP.
376 (1970); Isaacon, A Fresh Look at the Labor Injunction. Paper delivered at Seventeenth
Annual Institute of Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, Oct. 16, 1970.
77. Cf. C.G. Conn Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939); New York Telephone Co.,
186 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 75 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1970); Dow Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1150
(1965); Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1965). See also NLRB v. Insurance
Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477,496 n.28 (1960).
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concluding that if the activity which sets the train of events in
motion-the refusal to work overtime-is within the "ambit" of
section 7, any subsequent steps in support of that activity are similarly
protected. Since the employee cannot work on his own terms, the
refusal to work would be unprotected, and the union fine would be out
of bounds.78 At the same time, the fine is imposed for crossing a picket
line which, in itself, is perfectly lawful. Perhaps the focus is more
properly upon the actual tactics which have triggered the fine rather
than the more remote union sanctions which have given rise to use of
the picket line. 79 The unauthorized or wildcat stoppage has more
surface simplicity. As Professor Summers has noted,1° the courts have
not questioned union fines aimed at wildcatters. The Allis-Chalmers
opinion pointed out that the strike in question was "authorized"; one
could therefore assume that the fine imposed against dissenters who
engage in unauthorized activity is permissible as well. This
conclusion, like that advocated with regard to strikes in breach of
contract, is compatible with the national labor policy favoring
industrial peace.
Indeed, in NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc.,81 the Fifth Circuit has
relied upon Allis-Chalmersin determining whether a wildcat stoppage
is protected activity under section 7 of the Act. Said the Court:
An employee in effect pledges when he joins the union that he will exercise some
of his Section 7 rights only in accordance with the majority choice of his union.
Allis-Chalmers is reinforced by the subsequent decision of Scofield v. NLRB.
The extent to which any individual employee's Section 7 rights will be held

limited by the needs of his collective bargaining unit has been the subject of
case by case development. Allis-Chalmers limits those rights at least vis-a-vis
the member's union in picketing situations. By the proviso to Section 9(a), the
Act indicates a preference for collective as opposed to individual action in
negotiation with the employer . . . . In Allis-Chalmers, as showing that
recourse to the union 'before engaging in concerted activity is both necessary

and effective, the Supreme Court noted the need to preserve the union as
exclusive bargaining agent, the Landrum-Griffin Act as a means to protect the

speech and voting rights of members, and the judically expanded duty of fair
representation.

But in my judgment, Judge Godbold's opinion relies excessively
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See the cases cited in note 77 supra.
Cf. General Gravure Service Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 75 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970).
Summers-LegalLimitations 1065-66.
75 L.R.R.M. 2023 (5th Ci'. 1970).
Id. at 2025-26.
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upon Allis-Chalmers. In the first place, determining whether the
strike, albeit an unauthorized one, is unprotected activity is no easy
task. The Board and the courts have struggled with the question for
some time.8 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's own precedent in this area,
NLRB v. R.C. Can Co.,s4 has limited section 7 protection to those
stoppages wherein the union policy and the strikers' objective
displayed an identity of interests. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not
seeni to appreciate the fact that, in addition to recognizing both the
right to participate in strike votes and the duty of fair representation
as a means of protection for individual dissenting employees, AllisChalmers stood as well for a coherent national labor policy which
would permit the Board and the courts to consider the will of
Congress as reflected both in the National Labor Relations Act and
in other related statutes when dealing with the important question of
union discipline. Indeed, in a similar vein, the Supreme Court has held
in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRBm that a stoppage in breach of

contract is converted into protected activity where the employer has
provoked it through a major unfair labor practice which undermines
the foundation of the collective relationship. Where selection of the
collective bargaining representative is not free, said the Court, the
ordinary assumptions about contractual obligations are not
applicable. The same kind of public policy .considerations can be
invoked with regard to unauthorized stoppages where the union as
well as the employer is an offending party. Moreover, the broad view
of the national labor policy ordered by Allis-Chalmers also dictates
such an approach in the union fine cases. Thus, if an employee was
fined for engaging in critical free speech or some other substantive
right protected by section 7 of the Act or by Landrum-Griffin,
presumably the union's objective would be illegitimate, and the fine
would constitute a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). The same analysis
may apply where the fine was imposed for an unauthorized walkout to
protest the union's suppression of speech, at least where the speech
was related to a collective bargaining or employment status issue and
where management was also involvedA It cannot be gainsaid that,
83. A critical analysis of the overall effort to resolve this problem is contained in Gould, The
Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967).

84. 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964).
85. 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See also Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
86. See Gould, supra note 3, at 260. The requirement that the protest involve employment

status is especially emphasized in Marine Workers. 391 U.S. at 418.
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where possible, purely internal union problems should be resolved in
forums outside the workplace. For in such an instance, an innocent
party-the.employer-is involved and unnecessarily damaged.
Similar problems arise in connection with union discipline aimed at
dissident walkouts over racial discrimination. Here, public policy is
clearly evidenced-if not implemented-on the part of both the
Congress and The Executive branch through Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,11 the Civil Rights Act of 1866,8 and the
President's Executive Order." The leading case in this area, NLRB v.
Tanner Motor Livery Ltd.,' 0 relies heavily upon its reading of AllisChalmers.

In Tannertwo employees picketed their employer in an attempt to
persuade him to hire Negroes as part of the work force. Since there
was no evidence that the employees were conflicting with the lawful
position of their exclusive bargaining representative on this issue and
because a finding that the concerted activities of the employees were
rendered unprotected by a labor contract would be offensive to public
policy, the Board concluded that the activity was protected." The
deficiencies of the Board's opinion in Tanner are legion.' 2 Suffice it to
say here that the opinion hardly answers in any respect the very
important questions raised by the conflict between the statutes
protecting both employees against racial discrimination and those
protecting the collective bargaining process itself. While the Ninth
Circuit's analytical effort far outdistances that of the Board, the
court's opinion refuses to pay heed to any public policy or statutory
provision except the principle of exclusivity articulated in the
National Labor Relations Act.Y
Preliminarily, the court noted its "allegiance" to the Fourth
Circuit's Draper decision" which held that, regardless of the objectives of the minority strikers, minority activity not sanctioned by the
exclusive representative was per se unprotected. In order to resolve the
87. 78 Stat. 24 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 2000e-1 to 15 (1964).
88. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). See Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.,
3 F.E.P. Cas. 146 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 2 F.E.P. Cas, 942

(5th Cir. 1970).
89. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).

90. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
91. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 72,71 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1969).
92. See Gould, Black Power and the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships,79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969).
93. 419 F.2d at 222-23.

94. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).

Vol. 1970:1067]

UNION DISCIPLINE LIMITATIONS

1087

disparate positions taken by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in R.C.
Can and Draper, the court purported to look to Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield. Said the court:
In our view Allis-Chalmers in particular recognizes the growing tendency to
insure that an individual member's views are aired inside the union. Statutes
and decisional law promote free speech. ." and democratic decision-making
processes . . . within the union. Decisions like Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
rely on these factors to give weight to a union majority's decision. In AllisChalmers and Scofield the court opted for concerted union activity, and upheld
reasonable union sanctions against union members who sought to pursue a
contrary course. If the union can expect a modicum of allegiance after a
majority has made a decision, then the employer should be entitled to rely on
that allegiance in negotiations with the union. The Court was upholding
concepts of orderly bargaining which apply from either viewpoint.. . . The
racial aspects of this case emphasize the problem of what action is proper when
the intra-union processes produce a majority decision which is outside legally
acceptable bounds. . . . [These two employees]. . . had an obligation to go
to the union with their desire. for non-discriminatory hiring. The record does
not demonstrate that they approached the union, nor does it indicate that the
union gave its sanction to their actions. Thus, while their concerted activity
does fall within section 7, the operation of section 9(a) deprives it of the
protection to which it would otherwise be entitled. 5

But the problems with the Ninth Circuit's reading of federal labor

law in Tanner, particularly its interpretation of Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield, are enormous, especially when one considers the issue of

union discipline under section 8(b)(1)(A) in this connection. Just as
the Court, in Mastro Plastics, attempted to uphold public policy
through immunizing otherwise unlawful strike activity and wanted to

maintain free selection of the collection representative, so also here the
union which attempts to discipline workers should be required to

establish its own good faith on racial integration in order to sustain
the fine. Allis-Chalmers does not support suppression of anti-

discrimination picketing. On the contrary, the Court's willingness to
take a panoramic view of national labor law seems to indicate the
erroneous nature of the Tannerruling.
Through civil rights legislation and the Executive Order, both
Congress and the Executive have indirectly demonstrated their belief
that the record of labor unions in the area of employment
discrimination is a poor one." Thus, if one follows the general intent
95. 419 F.2d at 221.
96. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS REPT. FOR THE UNITED STATES
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM. (1969); Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial
Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969).
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of civil rights legislation, dissident pressure aimed at such institutions
with the objective of eliminating discrimination is protected from
union discipline under section 8(b)(1)(A) unless the union can
establish that the unauthorized activity offends the exclusive
representation principle because of the union's implementation of a
progressive policy or unless the employer, over union objections,
unilaterally institutes fair working conditions."
The difficulties involved in declaring a particular stoppage
protected or unprotected make all the more indefensible the Marine
Workers requirement that the initial controversy between employee
and union involve subject matter "within the ambit" of section 7.
Suppose that employees walk out without formal union authorization
in the context of a no-strike clause. The workers may nevertheless
believe that their activity is protected-perhaps because of one of the
theories expounded above-or that, subsequent to discharge or
discipline, their interests have not been properly defended by the union
in arbitration. As a result, those employees who are sufficiently
disgruntled file unfair labor practice charges against the union as well
as the company. After the Regional Director and General Counsel
dismiss the complaint, the union fines the workers for filing the
charges. Subsequently-filed unfair labor practice charges aimed at the
union fines should not fail simply because the walkout was not found
to be protected and was therefore outside the ambit of section 7.
Indeed, the Board has correctly concluded that the charges will be
sustained so long as the original unfair labor practice charges were
filed in good faith.' 8 A contrary result would require the average
worker to guess correctly the legal outcome of the initial proceeding.
Such an approach would have a chilling effect on the uninhibited use
of Board facilities as well as the general assertion of section 7 rights."
Finally, in addition to the no-strike issues noted above, the scope
of union authority has a direct bearing upon the grievance-arbitration
machinery and, therefore, the statutory policy of industrial peace.
Suppose that a union adopts a by-law which obligates its members
not to provide testimony or statements at any step of the grievance
97. See Gould, supra note 92, at 70-72.
98. See Brief for NLRB at 17, NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); cf.Schatzki,
Some Observationsand Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer. "ProtectedConcertedAction,"
47 TEXAS L. Rv.378 (1969).
99. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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machinery without the presence and permission of union
representatives. 10 The policy would have a more than adequate
potential for mischief. An employee who participated in a walkout
protesting shift assignments, for instance, might effectuate a
modification or complete elimination of individual penalties with
which he is saddled if he can prove that he believed the stoppage to be
authorized. 01 It might then be difficult for the employer to impose
penalties upon him and to have the decision sustained by an
arbitrator.
On the other hand, the union's interest may conflict with that of
the individual. For example, such testimony might expose the union
treasury to damages and jeopardize the employment status of the
union officials involved. Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has erroneously concluded that the duty of fair representation
does not confer upon such rank-and-file workers a right to be present
at an arbitration hearing deciding their fate, 02 it seems quite clear that
union fines that buttress the exclusion of the individual from any step
of the process-as well as the arbitration hearing alone-tip the scales
too far against the individual's interest. Union discipline may not
lawfully interfere with participation in a process so integral to the
public policy favoring industrial peace. The Marine Workers
discussion concerning the Board's processes leads one to the
conclusion that the fine in our hypothetical under discussion
constitutes restraint and coercion within the meaning of section
8(b)(1)(A).103
THE APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS

Although the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) purports to protect the
union's internal affairs insofar as they relate to the acquisition and
retention of membership, the Board has declared expulsion as well as
fining unlawful in limited circumstances. °0 Where the public policy
100. [Jan.-Mar. 1970] NLRB GEN. COUN. Q. REP. ON CASE DaV., reprinted at 4 CCH
L. REP.
8078, at 13,755-7 (1970). See Harnischfeger Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 75
L.R.R.M. 1495.
LAB.

101. For example, he may testify that the shop steward or the local union president advised
him-incorrectly as it turns out-that the walkout was immunized from breach of contract
sanctions.
102. Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987

(1969). The decision is critized in Gould, supra note 96, at 60-64.
103. See cases cited in note 75 supra. See also Guy's Foods, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 85,

L.R.R.M. - (Feb. 22, 1971), where a union's refusal to process a grievance until an unfair
labor practice charge was withdrawn was held to violate section 8(b)(l)(A).

104. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
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factor-for example, access to the Board's processes-is substantial,
the language of the proviso is overlooked. However, where the
employee wages all-out war upon the union through the filing of a
decertification petition, the Board has permitted expulsion since the
union needs to protect its inner councils from the enemy and since the
worker expelled hardly desires to retain his membership.
Of course, both expulsion and fining may have a devastating
impact upon the worker's employment status. The fine, to the extent
that it is enforceable or considered by the workers as such, has an
impact which is similar to a deduction from wages or a reduction in
seniority rights. Expulsion, at least from a trade where the union is a
strong and stable entity, signifies a deprivation of the ability to earn
one's living. But this more severe penalty raises a direct confrontation
with the language of the proviso. Reconciliation of the proviso with
protection of the worker's employment status would probably be
dependent upon the ability of the worker to evidence a real,
immediate, and substantial impact upon his job opportunities as well
as contravention of a fundamental right such as the right to file
charges with the Board where the employee's working conditions are
in some way threatened.
Thus, in rejecting the union's contentions that the employee
should be required to exhaust remedies in an internal union
proceeding, the Court in Marine Workers noted that the underlying
issue involved in the charging party's initial charge with the Board
implicated the employer as well as the union. While striking down
fines imposed because an employee filed a decertification petition", or
supported a rival union,'" the Board has refused to interfere with the
sanction of removal from union office for the same offense"' because
the proviso places such action beyond the reach of the NLRA.
105. Smith Lee Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 74 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1970); Blackhawk Tanning
Co., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969). Chairman Miller has expressed his
concurrence in the majority view in Blackhawk. See Spitter-Demmer, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 1576
(1970); cf. NLRB v. American Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 411 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.
1969); Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Van Camp Sea Food Co., 159
N.L.R.B. 843 (1966); Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965). In the context of
racial discrimination, the Board has become substantially involved in internal union affairs. See
NLRB v. Local 1367, ILA, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967);
Houston Maritime Ass'n, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1967), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 426 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1970).
106. Westvaco Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 126,74 L.R.R.M. 1698 (1970).
107. Id.; Smith Lee Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 129,74 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1970).
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National Tea Co. I's presents a somewhat different result. In that case,
a shop steward filed a grievance with the union alleging that
management was violating the collective bargaining agreement
through the use of an independent contractor. The union's business
agent began processing the grievance and arranged several meetings
between various company officials, the business agent, and the
secretary-treasurer of the local during the following two months.
Finally, approximately four months after the grievance had been filed,
the company promised to accede to the union's demands. But,
meanwhile, the shop steward had become impatient with efforts to
settle the dispute and had filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the union, alleging that it had unlawfully refused to process the
grievance and therefore violated section 8(b)(1)(A). Subsequent to the
settlement of the grievance, the regional director of the Board
approved withdrawal of the unfair labor practice charge.
Shortly thereafter, the union executive committee passed a
resolution which removed the charging party from his post of steward
because he had filed charges with the Board. As a result, the
charging party lost both superseniority, which he held because of his
office, and freedom from any obligation to pay monthly dues. The
trial examiner concluded that the union's action violated section
8(b)(1)(A) since the union, through use of the sanction, "effectively
demonstrated to all its members, whether job stewards and/or rankand-file employees, that all were prohibited from seeking recourse to
the Board unless they first resorted to the union's internal procedures
for their relief." 109 Moreover, the trial examiner held that the
deprivation of the steward's superseniority was an unlawful
interference with his employment status and therefore violated section
8(b)(2) of the Act.110 Therefore, the trial examiner held that the
employee should be reinstated as job steward with superseniority and
that he be reimbursed for the payment of monthly dues which he had
been compelled to resume paying as the result of his loss of office. The
Board affirmed, with Member Brown dissenting.
The thrust of Member Brown's dissent was that no employee
rights were impinged by the union's action. He stated:
All that is involved is a disagreement between a shop steward and his superior
in the Union on the handling of a grievance. Such disagreements do not raise
108. 181 N.L.R.B. No. 116,73 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1970).
109. id. at 1530.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964).
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issues of Section 7 employee rights merely because the shop steward files a
charge with the Board. Looking through the charge to the underlying nature of
this dispute, I find no basis for bringing the Union's removal of Sabatasse as
shop steward under the regulation of this Act. This being so, the loss of

superseniority falling from the removal is equally outside the statutory
proscriptions. I would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. M

If the shop steward had filed a decertification petition, restoration
of union office as a remedy would be more difficult to sustain. But the
principal difficulty in National Tea Co. -whether the focus of dispute
is a decertification petition or an unfair labor practice charge which
may set the stage for decertification or rival union activity-is that
employment status is necessarily involved. Although the charging
party would not have been laid off as the result of alteration of his
employment status, his position on the job ladder was affected by
resort to Board processes. Moreover, if economic conditions required
a substantial reduction in the work force, the charging party's
possible layoff would make the deprivation of superseniority an even
more graphic form of retaliation.
One feature of the trial examiner's remedy-the restoration of the
charging party's previous freedom from dues payment-went
completely unnoticed in Member Brown's dissenting opinion.
Suppose the charging party had refused to pay the dues, and the
union's request for his discharge had triggered the unfair labor
practice charge. This situation potentially raises far-reaching issues
which are certain to arise in the future. This relationship between the
right of the unions to discipline and the obligation of dissenting
members to pay dues and initiation fees under a union security
provision of a collective bargaining agreement is raised in McGraw
Edison Co."'

In McGraw, the union disciplined the individual employee, one
Arnold Blaine, for committing an act of "dual loyalty" by filing a
decertification petition with the Board. The discipline-not so severe
as expulsion-included a recommendation that Blaine be suspended
indefinitely from membership, denied the right to attend local meetings, and denied the right to hold office in the local during his suspension. When Blaine refused to pay dues while his membership rights
were denied, the union attempted to secure his discharge. This discharge attempted by the union, not the earlier impairment of Blaine's
membership rights, then triggered the filing of an unfair labor
111. 73 L.R.R.M.at 1531.

Vol. 1970:1067]

UNION DISCIPLINE LIMITATIONS

1093

practice charge by Blaine. Since the union could lawfully expel a
member or suspend his membership for the filing of a decertification
petition,113 and, in the light of earlier judicial recognition of TaftHartley's hostility to "free riders" who gain the benefits of union
contracts without assuming any obligations,1 14 the union regarded its
position as sound. But insofar as enforcement of the union's security
provision is concerned, the Board was faced with the second branch of
the proviso to the statutory provision governing union security,
section 8(a)(3)(B), which states that an employer cannot justify
discrimination against an employee for nonmembership "if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership .... "15 Does
section 8(a)(3)(B) mean that if "membership" is impaired by the
union for any reason other than "the failure to pay," the union
violates the statute through insistence on payment of dues? Or, since
"membership," as used in the statute, is equated with the payment of
periodic dues and initiation fees,' is section 8(a)(3)(B) to be read to
protect the worker who possesses a kind of agency shop
membership-a worker who in fact pays periodic dues and initiation
fees but is not permitted to possess all the indicia of union
membership that have direct bearing on employment status such as
strike and ratification vote participation? Is such a worker required to
pay periodic dues under the statute? The Supreme Court has shed
some light on this question in NLRB v. General Motors,"7 where it
held that an employee who voluntarily rejected full membership
under an agency shop contract and paid only periodic dues and
112. Steel Workers Local 4186 (McGraw Edison Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. No. 162,73 L.R.R.M.
1570 (1970) (Case No. 3-CB-1 192, TXD-539-69). On the relationship between union discipline
and union security insofar as the closed shop and internal union by-laws are concerned, see
Comment, Closed Shop Union Bylaws Under the N.L.R.A., 37 U. CI. L. REV.778 (1970).
113. See cases cited in note 105 supra.
114. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1961); cf.United Nuclear Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1965). See also Union Starch &Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d
1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); Macaluso, The NLRB "'Opens the Union,"
Taft-HartleyStyle, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 443 (1951).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(B) (1964).
116. See NLRB v. General Motors Co., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). See also cases cited in note 114
supra. Cf. Kenco Films, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 1 (1961); Al Massera, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 837
(1952).
117. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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initiation fees could be denied participation in the strike and contract
ratification vote."" Is there any valid distinction between the worker
who is involuntarily deprived of full membership because of union
discipline and the agency shop member who voluntarily accepts
limited membership? Is any payment by the former to be less than
that imposed upon a full member who voluntarily subjects himself to
more obligations and therefore possesses more rights?
The trial examiner in McGraw interpreted section 8(a)(3)(B) to
mean that employer discrimination imposed upon a worker whose
membership is impaired for any reason other than non-payment of
dues is unlawful. Thus, he asserted, "[it is patent that since the
disciplinary action was imposed upon Blaine because of the
decertification petition, the Respondent could not lawfully seek his
discharge under the § 8(a)(3) provisos because that would constitute
a reason other than the failure to pay dues."' 1 9 The union countered
that the employee who was expelled or suspended occupied the same
status as an agency shop member who did not choose to join the union
but was obligated to pay dues. Moreover, argued the union, section
8(b)(2) and the section 8(a)(3) provisos were "designed to protect
both the union from free-riders and employees who are willing to pay
for their ride."' 20 The trial examiner, however, rejected such a
statutory dual purpose since, in the latter case, the union did not need
protection. Blaine, the trial examiner found, was "willing to pay for
his ride if accorded the rights and privileges of membership," unlike
the "freerider" who did not wish to join or to pay but was required by
2
statute to do the latter.' 1
Mbre narrowly based, the Board's decision essentially held
that
combination of the union discipline with enforcement of the union
118. A majority of the Board presented a somewhat garbled version of the situation. See
General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451,456-57 n.12 (1961). However, it is clear that agency
shop members do not have such rights. See CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL UNION, U.A.W.,
art. 6, § 20. Agency shop members receive "material benefits" including strike benefits. See
Communication from U.A.W. General Counsel Stephen P. Schlossberg to the author, Oct. 26,
1970. For a discussion of the enforceability of strike fund benefits by a member's suit, see
Hansen v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 24 Utah 2d 30,465 P.2d 35 1, cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960 (1970). On a union's ability to bargain about correlative employer strike insurance, see
Associated General Contr. of America, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 76 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1970).
119. 181 N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 5, 73 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1970) (Case No. 3-CB-1 192 TXD.
539-69) (quoted language deleted in L.R.R.M. report).
120. See Brief for Respondent, McGraw Edison Co., 73 L.R.R.M. 1570. (1970) (Case No.
3-CB-1192).
121. 181 N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 8,73 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1970) (Case No.3-CB-I 192 TXD-53969) (quoted language deleted in L.R.R.M. report).
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security clause was hardly necessary to preserve the union's existence
as an institution. At the same time, it noted, the sanctions were
obvious coercion which would have the effect of discouraging a
member from invoking the Board's representation procedures.
However, the Board was careful not to say, as did the trial examiner,
that the threat to discharge was unlawful because membership would
be denied for reasons "other than" the failure to pay periodic dues
and initiation fees. Rather, the emphasis of the Board's McGraw
opinion is upon the protected nature of the activity which gave rise to
the employee's problems and the combined weight of two features of
union power-suspension and enforcement of the union security
clause.
But the Board said the following:
As our decision in this case is based on the coercive steps taken as a result of
filing of a decertification petition, we need not pass upon whether a labor

organization violates § 8(b)(l)(A) through enforcement of a union security
clause against a member whose membership was impaired for reasons

unrelated to seeking access to Board decertification processes."2

Therefore, the Board will be called upon to consider the implications
of McGraw and the reading to be given section 8(a)(3)(B) in a variety
of situations in the future. In the first possible situation, quite similar
to McGraw itself, the employee, rather than filing a decertification
petition, simply invokes the Board's processes to file unfair labor
practice charges against the union. Is the combination of expulsion or
suspension coupled with enforcement of the union security clause
unlawful here? Presumably, the answer is in the affirmative since the
union's need to protect itself is not any greater and, indeed, a less
apparent one than in McGraw. But is section 8(a)(3)(B) to be read as
literally as the trial examiner seemed to indicate? In other words, is
the denial of membership for any reason other than the failure to pay
periodic dues and initiation fees grounds for a violation where the
union security clause is enforced? Suppose that a worker attempts to
resign and is subjected to impairment of membership status as a
result. Suppose he, of his own volition, indicates a desire for such impairment through resignation. Suppose no resignation at all is in122. Id. at n.6. The remarks of Senator Taft, while they indicate that employees can be
discharged for the failure to pay dues or initiation fees, are not directly responsive to the issue
involved. See 93 CONG. REc. A3369 (1947).
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volved, but an agency shop or limited-less than full-member is
dissatisfied with his extent of participation in union affairs through
the denial of the right to vote in strike and ratification meetings.
UNION SECURITY AND THE EFFECT OF

Allis-Chalmers

In A llis-Chalmers, Justice Brennan stressed the fact that the
employees involved were "full members" and that full membership
would be presumed unless evidence were produced to the contrary.
Although the collective bargaining agreement contained a union
security clause which, by definition, set forth less than full
membership requirements, the Court said the "relevant inquiry here is
not what motivated a member's full membership . . ...
,2 This
approach seems singularly unrealistic inasmuch as most workers are
under the impression that the union shop provision compels
membership, and few are aware that the proviso to section 8(a)(3)
prohibits union security arrangements which require more than
a nominal "membership" in the form of payment of dues and initiation fees. The fact that this agency shop requirement constitutes the
outer limits of the permissible union shop has escaped the attention
of the average employee as well as many members of the bar.
Thus, an inquiry into a member's motivation for joining the union
might indeed be relevant. On the other hand, such an inquiry might
bog the Board down in testimony which would often prove
unreliable.l A In any event, the Court apparently intends to distinguish
between gradations of membership and, presumably, employees who
refuse to do more than pay dues and initiation fees may not be subject
to the broad union-imposed obligations upheld by the majority in
Allis-Chalmers. At a minimum, one can state with certainty that
this question has been left for future resolution. The Court is concerned with the voluntary or involuntary assumption of membership
obligations. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Black contended, if union
security provisions are used to compel the payment of court-enforced
fines by employees unwilling to participate in the stoppage, "then the
union security clause is being used for a purpose other than 'to compel
payment of union dues and fees.' It is being used to coerce employees
to join in union activity in violation of § 8(b)(2)."'2 Finally, as noted
123. 388 U.S. at 196.

124. A similar problem arises in the authorization area. See Levi Strauss Co., 172 N.L.R.B.
No. 57,68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
125. 388 U.S. at 215. In discussing the union security provisions of the Railway Labor Act in
Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), Mr. Justice Douglas asserted: "The
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above, the value of an inquiry into whether membership-upon the
basis of which fines are imposed-is voluntary or involuntary is
highly questionable since the average worker does not know that the
statute only permits a requirement of limited membership.,
If there is any question about the extent of membership which will
render an employee liable to fines under Allis-Chalmers-a problem

which could be exaggerated further if workers insist upon substantial
participation in union affairs as a price for paying dues and initiation

fees-some workers may choose to opt out altogether by resigning
from union membership. The Board, dealing with the right to resign
during the escape period under maintenance of membership contracts

and during any hiatus that may exist between two collective agreements containing union security clauses, 128 has recognized a qualified

right to resign under the "right to refrain" portions of section 7 of the
Act. Thus, the Board cited the
fundamental principle that an employee joining a voluntary labor union for an
indefinite period may resign therefrom at will ....
We see nothing in the
Union's constitution which can be said, even through the loosest construction
of words, to have bound [the resignee] to involuntary membership a single

day.1"
assessments that may be lawfully imposed do not include fines and penalties. The financial
support required relates, therefore, to the work of the union in the realm of collective
bargaining." Id. at 235.
126. The collective bargaining agreement itself often encourages members' confusion by
requiring "membership" as a condition of employment. For example, the agreement of Oct. 25,
1967, between the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto Workers states that
"membership" is required as a condition of employment after the 30-day grace period. In a
shorter paragraph, it states that an employee who tenders uniform initiation fees and periodic
dues is "deemed" to have satisfied the "membership" condition. But quite often the agreement
simply requires "membership" and is enforced by an arbitrator. See, e.g., K & K Mfg., Inc., 55
Lab. Arb. 865 (1970).
The Board itself has contributed to the confusion through contract bar rules which protect the
signatory parties to such arrangements from raids by rival unions. See Paragon Prods. Corp.,
134 N.L.R.B. No. 662 (1961), overruling Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 880 (1958).
127. NLRB v. Mechanical Workers Local 444,427 F.2d 883 (Ist Cir. 1970); Boeing Co., 173
N.L.R.B. No. 71, 69 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1968); Atlantic Research Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 610
(1967); United Nuclear Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 629 (1964), modified, 340 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1965);
May Dept. Stores, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1961); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
1322 (1953), enforced sub nam. Communications Workers v. N.L.R.B., 215 F.2d 835 (2d Cir.
1954). However, where arbitration has taken place, the Board has refused to review the
effectiveness of the resignation even though the individual employee did not participate in the
proceeding. See Western Elec. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 18,73 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969).
128. Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955). But see National Lead Co., Titanium
Division, 106 N.L.R.B. 545 (1953).
129. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1324 (1953).
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A majority of the Board adopted a similar approach in a strike

situation quite recently in Boeing Co. 3 ' Upon expiration of the
collective agreement between the IAM and Boeing, the union

commenced a lawful strike against the company which lasted 18 days.
Both the old and new-contract contained maintenance of membership
clauses which required new employees to notify both the union and the

company of their desire not to join the union within 40 days of
accepting employment. While the strike was in progress, about 143 of

the approximately 1900 workers in the bargaining unit continued to
report for work. All such employees had been members of the union
during the contract period. While some of the strike-breaking workers
made no attempt to resign from the union, the rest submitted
voluntary resignations in writing to both the union and the company

either prior to reporting to work during the strike or subsequent to
returning to work. All resignations were submitted between the

effective period of the two contracts, and all of the employees involved
had submitted resignations prior to the imposition of discipline by the

union. Although the union had not warned their members about the
possible imposition of disciplinary measures for strike-breaking, the
IAM constitution provides that employees found guilty of misconduct
are subject to a reprimand, fine, suspension, or expulsion from
membership subsequent to a hearing. The IAM constitution sets no

maximum dollar limitation on fines. Following a hearing, the union
imposed fines on all strike-breaking employees regardless of whether

or when they had resigned from the union. There was no indication of
the method of computing such fines.

The preliminary issue related to whether the union, by imposing
fines upon workers who had resigned from the union before engaging
in the conduct complained of, had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
130. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970). Accord, General Gravure Service Co.,
186 N.L.R.B. No. 691, 75 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970); Hearst Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 75
L.R.R.M. 1338 (1970); General Electric Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 105,75 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1970);
Washington Post Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1970); Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 75 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1970); International Paper Box
Mach. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 76 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1970); cf. Union Carbide Corp., 180
N.L.R.B. No. 135, 75 L.R.R.M. 1143 (1970), reconsidered, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 75
L.R.R.M. 1456 (1970). One of the obvious problems with a right of resignation as the Board has
articulated it in Boeing is that it can be quite difficult to determine whether the union is imposing
the fine for conduct prior to the resignation or subsequent to it. See General Gravure Service
Co., supra. An employee has a section 7 right to revoke a checkoff authorization. See, e.g.,
Nathan's Famous of Yonkers, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 19,75 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1970); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 75 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1970); C.R.W. Metals Division, Inc.,
172 N.L.R.B. No. 34,68 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1968).
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Act. The union argued that levying a fine against a resignee could not
constitute unlawful coercion since the nonmember could not be

coerced by a membership obligation. Concluding that a violation had
occurred, a majority of the Board rejected the union's contention:
The levy of a fine is calculated to force an individual both to pay money and to
engage in particular conduct against his will. This is true regardless of the
ultimate collectibility of the fine. A man who is held up at gunpoint is coerced
whether or not the gun is loaded. As with the levy of a fine, the coercion lies in
the calculated threat and, as has been held, the "argument that the fines
imposed were not collectible in a court of law, even if accepted is beside the
point." The imposition of a fine has immediate coercive consequences. Faced
with the possibility of action against him, the employee may well be, for
practical purposes, impelled to forego his statutory right not to honor the
Union's picket line rather than risk involvement in a lawsuit whose outcome he
cannot predict. Or, should he choose to take that risk, he will find it necessary
to hire counsel whose services he ordinarily would not require. 13

The Board characterized the Allis-Chalmersholding as predicated

upon the underlying relatioriship between the union and its members
and noted that the Court there had made approving reference to the
contract theory of union membership. However, the Board reasoned:
The significance of the membership relationship is that it establishes the
union's authority over its members. In joining a union, the individual member
becomes a party to a contract-constitution. Without waiving his Section 7 right
to refrain from concerted activities, he consents to the possible imposition of
union discipline upon his exercise of that right. . . .But the contract between
the member and the union becomes a nullity upon his resignation. Both the
member's duty of fidelity to the union and the union's corresponding right to
discipline him for breach of that duty are extinguished. 32

Since the discipline imposed upon resignees here was, in effect, not
consented to by those resignees, the Board concluded that the

discipline was not protected by the proviso and constituted unlawful
coercion. The Board noted that Allis-Chalmers was "carefully
restricted to the facts of that case," that it had stressed the difference

between the impact of the fine on limited and full members, and that
Scofield had specifically stated that the union member was free to
131. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23,75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1005 (1970).
132. Id. at 1006. Application of the waiver theory in this context is implausible. As Professor
Atleson has said, "[tihe waiver argument made by the Seventh Circuit dissenters in AllisChalmers is difficult to fathom. The right to be free from union fines cannot be waived upon
becoming a member, because the union would have no authority to impose the fines on an
employee who was not a member of the union." Atleson, supra note 49, at 718.
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leave the organization if he wished to escape the rule. However, the
Board did sustain the fines levied against the employees who had
engaged in misconduct prior to resignation from the union's ranks,
adding the caveat that the union's authority to discipline the members
extended only to the period of time that the employee was a member.
Thus, the remedy in such case is to "remit a prorata portion of the
fine, so that what remains reflects only preresignation conduct."'3
Member Brown dissented, asserting that Allis-Chalmers had
exonerated union fines insofar as section 8(b)(1)(A) is concerned:
If, as is the case here, a Union does not violate 8(b)(1)(A) by imposing or

threatening to impose a collectible fine, it is difficult to see how a presumably
un-collectible fine can be violative of that Section. Even if, as the majority
reasons, the employee concerned may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to

evaluate the Union's fine as "uncollectible," and thus feel completely free to
cross the picket line with impunity, he is plainly no more coerced than the fullfledged member. I

Finally, the dissenting opinion criticized the majority's analysis
concerning the timing of the resignations. Since the employees in
Boeing were members of the union before the strike began and, therefore, "fealty" had come into play, said Member Brown, once the
strike was authorized and began, resignation by the worker was in
itself a disloyal act of misconduct from the point of view of the union.
Such a view has at least arguable merit in the case of a worker who
has joined the union voluntarily without the coercion of a union
security clause. However, the analysis is at variance with Board law
on resignation under maintenance of membership provisions, law
which uniformly recognizes the worker's right to resign under
section 7.15 Member Brown's response was that jobs are directly
affected in such cases, unlike the situation where fines are imposed.
But, at least in some circumstances, both Allis-Chalmers and much
of its progeny obliterate that kind of distinction as more form than
substance.
For the most part, the difficulties with the Boeing doctrine are
quite different from those envisioned by Member Brown. In Boeing,
the Board adhered to the union-member contract obligation theory
in which it rationalized the right to resign. But as Professor Summers
133.
134.
135.
136.

75 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
Id.
See cases cited in note 127.supra.
Summers-Legal Limitations 1055.
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has said, this approach is a "'legal fabrication, ' 13 and the union's

status, rather than contract, is the significant factor in the unionemployee relationship. 13 To force this relationship within the contract, "pigeonhole"' ' e would imply that the worker consents to fines,

suspensions, and expulsion for any "conduct unbecoming a member"
while the union remains free to amend the worker's employment

contract at any time.' Moreover, as one court of appeals has recently
noted, the duty of fair representation is an important portion of the

relationship between union and member and cannot be waived."10
While it is true that the Court in Allis-Chalmers was mesmerized by

the contract theory of union constitutions,' it is the "right to
refrain" protected by section 7 which is appropriately paramount, not
the union-employee contract.
137. See generally Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism:Administrative
and JudicialControl of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435 (1963).
138. For an early discussion of some of the problems with regard to collective bargaining
agreements, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956).
Assuming, arguendo, that some contract principles apply to the union-employee relationship,
contract law cannot be said to favor forfeiture or actual penalties under the guise of liquidated
damages. 5 A. CORaIN, CoTRACTS §§ 1055, 1057, 1058 (2d ed. 1954); 3 S. WILLSTON, A
TREATISE ON TrH LAW OF CONTRACTS § 776 (rev. ed. 1936). It is against public policy to
impose penalties through contract. 5 A. CORBIN, supra, § 1055; 3 S. WILLISTON,
supra, § 776. See also Walsh v. Communications Workers, Local 2236, 75 L.R.R.M. 2629,
2632 (Md. Ct. App. 1970); cf.United Nuclear Corp. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 133, 136-37 (Ist Cir.
1965). Moreover, the union-employee contract might be regarded as a contract of adhesion
between two unequal parties with rules of its own. 6 A. CORBIN, supra, § 1376; 3 WILLIsTON,
supra, § 621. Further, the Board has encouraged employee assumption of union contract
obligations through permitting the union to offer financial inducements to join a labor
organization during a representation campaign. These inducements, including the offering of
initiation fees and dues deductions conditioned upon joining prior to certification, have been
approved on the theory that such benefits do not necessarily constitute an inducement to vote for
the union in the Board-conducted election. See Dit-MCO, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1967),
enforcement granted, NLRB v. Dit-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1970). Cf. Wagner
Electric Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 66 L.R.R.M. 1072 (1967). However, if majority status is not
prerequisite to the imposition of the fine by the union, see notes 196-202 infra and accompanying
text, the employee may be unfairly persuaded to vote for the union because, if the union loses,
Allis-Chalmers and its progeny will saddle him with serious burdens of membership without any
of the benefits.
139. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
140. De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajodores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
141. Said the Court: "Congress [in 1947] was operating within the context of the 'contract
theory' of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time." 388 U.S. at 192.
See also IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). Gonzales and a case arising in 1867, Masters
Stevadors Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly I (N.Y. 1867), were all the primary case authority that the
Court could muster for this proposition.
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To date, the Board has had little difficulty with its logic since
unions from which members have resigned have denied the right to do
so altogether' 2 or have imposed comparatively reasonable resignation requirements which the courts have honored."' But, where the
basis upon which resignations can be submitted is unduly restrictive,
the Board will be called upon to void the contract.
A union constitution which precludes resignation for a period of
time long enough to subject the worker to discipline for the predicted
duration of the strike would effectively nullify the section 7 rights
articulated in Boeing. To prevent this result, the Board will find it
necessary to modify both its contract theory and its concept that a
union is a voluntary association insofar as the two doctrines are tied
together to support the result achieved in Boeing. Clearly not a
voluntary association in the sense of a social club or fraternal
organization,"' the union bargains with exclusive statutory
authority"I over working conditions which are vital to the employees.
Thus, the argument that the section 7 right to refrain from union
action protects a dissident worker in the absence of a valid union
security contract provision, regardless of the content of the unionmember contract, would seem to stand on more solid ground insofar
as the right to resign is concerned. Such an approach might not
completely disallow consideration of the union's constitution; since
dues are paid a month in advance, it does not seem unreasonable to
pretermit resignation rights until the 30 days covered by the dues
142. The position of the union may be that the employee leaves the union through death or
departure from the industry. See General Gravure Service Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 691, 75
L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970).
143. E.g., NLRB v. UAW, 320 F.2d 12 (Ist Cir. 1963), clarified, Erhard Cons. Co., 187
N.L.R.B. No. 99,76 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1971); Hearst Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 78,76 L.R.R.M.
1219 (1970); John L. Paulding, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 298 (1963).
144. James v. Marinship'Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Betts v. Easley, 161
Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
145. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Court noted that

unions which possess exclusive representation rights by statute exercise quasi-legislative
functions and therefore owe employees within the unit the duty of fair representation. See
Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and Governmental Action, 70 YALE L.J. 345

(1961). But this hardly protects the worker in every instance in which he asserts constitutional
rights against union security provisions. Compare Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956); Gray v. Gulf, M. &0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970); Linscott v. Miller
Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970), with Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373
U.S. 113 (1963); IAM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). See generally Wellington, Machinists v.
Street: Statutory Interpretation.and the Avoidance of ConstitutionalIssues, 1961 Sup. CT.
REv. 49.
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payment have expired. But ultimately the union must rely upon
persuasiveness of a more rational nature than fines to implement their
decisions since the fine merely induces exercise of the section 7 right to
resign. As representatives of the workers, the unions should be the
first to recognize the bitterness engendered by such sanctions,
particularly when they are imposed upon those who work on an
hourly basis. Perhaps analysis of the right to resign will become
substantially academic if the exercise of the fine weapon declines.
Moreover, one would hope that the Board and the courts will reach
the same result by taking sufficient advantage of the language in AllisChalmers which makes the availability of democratic rights to
workers a prerequisite of any valid fine. Where such conditions
prevail, employees might be more interested in retaining membership.
However, where the controversy which gives rise to possible
resignation arises out of a lawful strike over new contract terms, none
of the approaches delineated above with regard to the proper timing of
the member's resignation 'prove satisfactory. Conversely, where
dissatisfaction is triggered during the term of the agreement by, for
instance, the failure to process a grievance, the poor handling of a
grievance, or the union's failure to press for an amendment to the
contract, the worker should be able to opt out of a solidarity which
would otherwise be imposed upon him, and the 30-day period
which I have advocated seems reasonable. This is especially true
where a union security agreement is in effect, and resignation is
thus simply a shift in degree from full to limited membership. The
union can protect itself against "free riders" while the worker
protects himself against the fine. But when a lawful strike arises out of
demands which would terminate or modify the terms of the previous
contract at that document's expiration, 1 " neither immediate
resignation rights, a 30-day grace period, or-as the UAW
Constitution provides-the right to resign at the end of the fiscal year
in December 4 7 makes any sense.
This strike, unlike the lawful stoppage that might occur during
the term of the agreement,1" envelops a wide variety of demands
146. This comports with the language of section 8(d) of the Act. Cf. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co.,
352 U.S. 282 (1957); International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Kaynard v. Communications Workers of America, 72 L.R.R.M. 2876, 2883 (E.D.N.Y. 1969);
New York Tel. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 75 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1970); General Electric Co., 181
N.L.R.B. No. 111, 73 L.R.R.M. 1526 (1970).
147. See CONST. OF INT. UNION, U.A.W. art. 6, § 17.

148. Strikes during the term of the agreement may be lawful in many instances. The most
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which will touch upon the interest of the occupational, age, and racial
factions within the group. Skilled tradesmen will seek to break
through the industrial union pattern of across-the-board increases
and, perhaps as an added measure of protection, may secure separate
contractual ratification rights-in effect, a veto over the contract.",
Black workers may seek access to better-paying jobs and the
elimination of discriminatory seniority systems. Retirees and older
workers may seek security which runs counter to the wishes of the
younger employees.s Out of all this comes a measure of accommodation and compromise-and where it does not, the duty of fair
representation as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411,
may set aside a bargain for which the union presses.
Where the exclusive bargaining agent has any power, the worker
must participate in its political process in order to shape his own
employment relationship. This is why, contrary to Member Brown's
dissent in Boeing, the mere participation in the convention-or in the
election of its delegates-as well as involvement in the strike vote itself
should not nullify the section 7 right to resign. To read the statute so
narrowly would compel the worker to abdicate all participation and
responsibility and encourage the balkanization of bargaining units.
More specifically, it would induce the potential dissident to make an
ill-informed and premature decision to resign before the policymaking decisions have been made, although the dissident worker who
is determined enough to resign from a powerful union may not be
recent analysis is contained in BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS: STRIKE AND LOCKOUTS
(Daily Labor Report No. 214, B-I, Nov. 3, 1970), which indicates, however, that the
unconditional prohibition of the strike is increasing. In the automobile industry the contract
often exempts disputes about production standards, health and safety, and new job rates from
the no-strike clause subsequent to union exhaustion of the grievance procedure. See Agreement

Between Ford Motor Co. and U.A.W. (Oct. 25, 1967) at 24, 56; Agreement Between General
Motors and U.A.W. (Dec. 15, 1967) at 36-40, 85-87, Agreement Between Chrysler Corp. and
U.A.W. (Nov. 10, 1967) at 7-8, 41-42.
149. The UAW's skilled craftsmen have obtained this right. See CONST. OF THE INT. UNION,
U.A.W. art. 19, § 3.
150. Apparently, the union has a statutory right to bargain for retirees. See Hooker Chemical
Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP.
22,415 (1970). But see Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1970).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). For a discussion of the impact of Title VII on one
traditional matter of interest to most employees, see Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker:
Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1039 (1969); Gould,
Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967).
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substantially influenced by rational discussion of a particular set of
issues.
The UAW Constitution, providing for the right to resign in
December at the end of the fiscal year, is ill-suited to a strike in the
auto industry, for instance, where contracts expire in mid-September.
The dissident UAW member who beiieves that his interests are not
adequately represented and who may wish to take action which will
expose him to financial liability could not resign at the time of the
March convention where initial policy was formulated, at the strike
vote in August, during the General Motors strike from September
through November,5 2 or at the time of the special convention in
October when an increase in dues was required by near depletion of
the strike fund.153 Thus, the member is effectively precluded from
resigning at any critical time when the right to resign is meaningful in
terms of the strike-.-at a time at which he is likely to know the general
drift of union policy. On the other hand, to permit the worker to leave
at any time seems to run too far against the grain of obligations
derived from voluntary participation, a theme which the Court
stressed so heavily in Allis-Chalmers.The same decision emphasized
the fundamental importance of the strike weapon for organized labor.
Thus, I am of the view that the holding in Boeing is too much at
variance with the spirit of Allis-Chalmers. While restrictions such
as those incorporated in the UAW Constitution are unreasonable
limitations on free choice in the strike context,'5 the strike should not
be so easily undermined, at least to the extent that Boeing permits.
The latter point is best illustrated by two hypotheticals. Suppose
that the UAW's "30 and Out" faction, demanding automatic
retirement benefits after 30 years in the plan, disagrees with the
leadership's conclusion that a compromise package providing for
retirement at the age of 58 at $500 per month for employees with 30
years of service's' was all that could be wrung from General Motors.
152. This and all subsequent references to the "General Motors strike" refer to the UAW's
strike of General Motors during the latter part of 1970.
153. See Flint, U.A. W. to Assess its Nonstrikers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1970, at 21, col. 1; The
U.A.W.: GettingPoorerand Tougher, BusiNEss WEEK, Oct. 31, 1970, at 75.
154. It should be noted, however, that the UAW appears to be one of the few unions to make
any attempt to deal with the matter at all.
155. See Flint, General Motors and Union Reach Terms for Pact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1970, at 1,col. 8.
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Despite contract ratification in which they participate,,' these
members urge their supporters to continue the strike in the teeth of
contrary instructions from President Woodcock and the Executive
Board. The example is beguilingly simple in at least two respects.
First, the stoppage is unauthorized and therefore unprotected, and the
"30 and Out" faction would be subject to discharge. Presumably, if
one accepts the notion that the law of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(1)
should be in close harmony, the unions should be allowed to bring
sanctions to bear where employers can do so. Since the stoppage is
contrary to public policy which favors exclusivity, workers should not
be able to escape through resignation in such a situation. But,
secondly, one might conclude that dissidents could avoid sanctions in
a timely fashion by resigning prior to participation in the ratification.
Yet this smacks too much of Member'Brown's dissent in Boeing to be
persuasive, although Member Brown would probably preclude
resignation also since the workers had voted on the strike itself. The
answer to the problem, if there is one, is to be found in an examination
of other considerations concerning the strike and its use.
The dissidents cannot have it both ways. If the right to strike on
behalf of the exclusive representative is fundamental to national labor
policy as Allis-Chalmers states, employees should not be in a position
to escape the obligations of membership at this most critical juncture.
The strikebreakers who trickle back when the stoppage becomes
unexpectedly extended may decide that their obligation expires
because they did not expect the employer to withstand economic
pressure for so long. If they are to feel secure from union discipline
only through resignation, the union may lose representation every
time it "loses" a strike. The militants may state that they have been
betrayed by the compromises effectuated and that they failed to resign
earlier only because they were deceived by the demands which were
later conceded. Moreover, they may assert that they were kept "in the
dark" by a union-company-imposed "blackout" of news and
information. The short answer to the latter assertion is that the nature
156. The efforts of UAW dissidents in connection with the 1970 General Motors strike were
hardly successful. See Flint, Contract with G.M. is Approved, 9 to 1, by U.A. W. Council, N.Y.

Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 1,col. 7. Contract ratification by the rank and file was overwhelming.
See Crellin, 23 G.M. Locals Ratify Pact, But Rebels Keep Up Fight, Detroit News, Nov. 17,

1970, at IA, col. I. For an excellent discussion of the dynamics of the UAW-General Motors
strike in 1970, see O'Donnel, The G.M. Striker- What Happened?.The Wall St. Journal, Nov.

20, 1970, at 10, col. 3; Pearlstine, Rallying the Ranks, The Wall St. Journal, Oct. 29, 1970, at I,
col. 6; Pearlstine, The Big Little Issues, The Wall St. Journal, Nov. 24, 1970, at 34, col. 1.
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of collective bargaining often compels such secrecy. The options for
the strikebreaker and the militant should be limited to the election of
a new leadership at an appropriate time through democratic
participation or to resignation shortly after the union's demands have
been formulated in a general sense.
Thus, resignation in the strike situation should be deemed timely
only when made within a reasonably short period of time subsequent
to the decision such as the strike vote or its equivalent. It cannot be
denied that such a rule may make the union think again and retreat
from potentially precipitous and blunderous action in the face of a
large number of resignations which, incidentally, would be most often
made while a union security contract was in effect, thus compelling
the resignee's payment of dues. The Board cannot prescribe a general
rule since internal union procedures and the collective bargaining
process must be flexible concerning timing. But international and
local officials more familiar with the practicalities of their industries
may be in a position to prescribe appropriate provisions for their
constitutions. The Board and the courts can review them in light of
the above-mentioned considerations. If the unions do not adopt
reasonable rules, they will be saddled with the right to resign
immediately, assuming the Boeing majority prevails in the courts.
The question of the power of unions to fine limited members seems
more difficult. Where the worker is a member under an agency shop
contract, one would assume that the union fines constitute a violation
of section 8(b)(l)(A) unless the presumption is overridden through
evidence indicating the member's substantial involvement in internal
union affairs including active participation in the decision which has
given rise to the fine-for example, the strike vote or attendance at a
union meeting where a production quota was discussed. Where the
union shop contract purports to require a kind of membership beyond
the "financial core" obligation imposed by statute, Allis-Chalmers
dictates an even more careful scrutinization of membership
participation on the p'art of the fined worker. For even though AllisChalmers eschews any concern With employee motivation, most
workers believe that such a contract creates an obligation to join
beyond mere financial support. Moreover, since under the
maintenance of membership contracts the member has made a
qualified undertaking only insofar as duration of membershiprather than the amount of participation-is concerned, the analysis
should be roughly comparable to that employed with regard to union
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shop membership requirements. As a precondition to discipline in
all situations-whether the resignation is from total or a more
limited form of membership-the union should be obligated to
notify the members of their right to resign from full or limited
membership. For the Board to hold otherwise seems inconsistent with
the basic notions of fairness in light of the present lack of employee
knowledge on this subject. Moreover, failure to require disclosure
encourages management-particularly in the strike context-to make
such information available to employees on a sub rosa basis and
increases the potential for "union busting" by an unscrupulous
management.
Two questions remain. The first relates to the extent to which our
answers to the McGraw case will vary with the form of the union
security agreement. The second concerns the implication of the union
fine cases for firmer regulation of the unlawful closed shop when it is
imposed de facto through internal union by-laws.
In McGraw, the Board protected the refusal to tender union dues
by an employee denied membership rights because of his exercise of
section 7 decertification rights. Suppose that the denial is imposed for
filing an unfair labor practice charge. In such circumstances the
refusal to pay dues seems more clearly protected since the union does
not necessarily have an opponent in its ranks and therefore has a lesser
need for protection. Moreover, if the exercise of some section 7 rights
prompts union discipline substantially limiting participation in union
affairs, the enforcement of the union security clause appears
improper. Some support for this approach appears in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railway57 where the Court, in fashioning the

duty of fair representation, stated that all employees have the right to
participate in collective bargaining decisions or seemingly, at a
minimum, to be notified of the action which the union contemplates.
In the hypothetical posed, one is not dealing with the "free rider" who
sought to obtain the benefits of union representation without
assuming any of the financial burdens and against whom Congress
sought to protect the unions. Here, the worker voluntarily seeks full
membership participation but, because of the exercise of a section 7
right, is not able to obtain such. In a sense, his position is antithetical
to that of the free rider for such a worker demands total involvement
in union affairs and is unwilling to pay the charges imposed upon full
157. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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members only if he cannot possess full membership rights. Does the
union need protection against workers who assert freedom from
internal restraints without demanding a free ride?
The unions will contend that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A)
dictates a laissez-faire approach to internal union affairs. Moreover,
since periodic dues and initiation fees represent the only kind of
membership which can be compelled pursufant to union security
provisions under the Act,"' the unions will assert that this obligation
is not easily disavowed. But suppose that full membership of the kind
found to exist in Allis-Chalmers is literally compelled by the language
of the union security provision in the union's contract with the
employer and that the union offers no evidence that the disciplined
employee has been put on notice about the outer limits of the
membership obligation. In such a case it would seem that deprivation
of the right to vote on strike and contract questions and the right to
attend meetings, where imposed in response to the exercise of section 7
rights by an employee who wishes to participate, coupled with the
compulsion to pay dues constitutes unlawful coercion rendering the
strikebreaker's obligation to pay dues unenforceable. Such a holding
would encourage unios to make clear the involuntary nature of full
membership. If they do not, dues payment resistance will make AllisChalmers a pyhrric victory. On the other hand, where the contract
merely requires financial support and the union-imposed discipline
withdraws rights which have been voluntarily assumed, the same
result seems less compelling since union coercion beyond financial
core membership obligations has not been asserted against the worker
by contract. Moreover, of course, where the employee is not
disciplined, but voluntarily will not undertake full membership, the
Court's holding in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.159 precludes a

finding of discrimination even though fill members possess union
rights of a fundamental nature not enjoyed by limited members. One
might argue that this rule will encourage potential free riders to join
the union and foment rebellion from within or to induce expulsion
158. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).

159. 373

U.S. 734 (1963). However, the Court stated:

Under the second proviso to § 8(a)(3), the burdens of membership upon which

employment may be conditioned are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees
and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but
membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be
conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. Id. at 742.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:1067

which will relieve them of dues payment responsibilities. While this
result seems unlikely if the union adopts proper safeguards as
delineated below, it is certainly not contrary to the policy of
encouraging the spread of collective bargaining as well as union
democracy. And, in any event, such workers who are presumably on
notice about membership rights would have difficulty asserting
statutory rights against discipline.
Even without any inquiry into the worker's notice of membership
rights, however, discipline which deprives the individual of political
rights inside the union appears to violate section 8(b)(1)(A) when that
discipline is imposed in retaliation for involvement in section 7
activity. This is consistent with the Board's apparent opinion that the
burden of periodic dues and initiation fees may be imposed only to
achieve-through the expenditures of such monies-benefits directly
related to collective bargaining responsibilities.", If the individual
employee is involuntarily separated from political participation, he is
deprived of a substantial portion of the benefits derived from the
payment of periodic dues and initiation fees; thus his financial
obligation should arguably be smaller than that of the full member if
not non-existent.
160. RCA Service Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1967); Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
(Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, Int'l Typographers) (July 22, 1970) (TXD-412-70). This
approach has considerably more to commend it than an excessive concern with determining
whether dues are "periodic" rather than an assessment upon the payment of which employment
may not be conditioned. Such considerations often obscure the importance of the expenditure to
the ability of the union to behave as a responsible collective bargaining agent. See NLRB v.
Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1962), where the raising of monies for a strike fund
was held to be an assessment rather than periodic dues within the meaning of the Act. Cf.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1925 (1954). Query, is the UAW's collection of
dues during the 1970 General Motors strike "periodic dues" or an assessment? The UAW strike
benefit funds "are a regular part of itt periodic dues structure." See Regional Director's letter
of dismissal to North American Aviation, Case No. 31-CB-286 (Nov. 20, 1967). For cases
where no violation was found in union assessments see Local 60, Ledther Goods Workers
(Rexbilt Leather Goods, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 396 (1964) (service charge); Local 409, Stage
Employees & Motion Picture Machine Operators (Harvey M. Dubver), 140 N.L.R.B. 759
(1963) (levy of percentage of gross earnings). For cases finding violations in union assessments,
see Dixie Broiler Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963) (dues based on nonattendance at meetings not
"uniformly" applied); Leece-Neville Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 56 (1962), enforced in part sub. nom.,
IBEW, Local 1377 v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 819 (1964)
(unlawful discharge for failing to pay charge for nonattendance at meetings); Paul Biazevich,
d/b/a MV Liberator (Local 33, Fishermen), 136 N.L.R.B. 13 (1%2) (payment of unspecified
nonperiodic assessment). But see Boise Cascade Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 971 (1967) (Board
reversed itself and held that financial inducements to attend union meetings could be
incorporated into dues structure):
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Yet the matter is not so simple. If it were, one would accept the
trial examiner's conclusion in McGraw that the exclusion from, or
impairment of, membership rights for any reason "other than" the
failure to pay periodic dues and initiation fees constitutes a violation
of section 8(a)(3)(B) or section 8(b)(1)(A). Such a position precludes
discharge for failure to pay dues even when the union has not expelled
or suspended a member for involvement in section 7 activity. For
instance, some members might develop the unfortunate habit of
interrupting the union meetings or behaving in a disruptive or
boisterous manner at such functions. Surely the union is entitled to
conduct its meetings in relative peace and calm.
Therefore one must balance the union's interest for which
protection is sought against the literal language of section
8(a)(3)(B).111 The literal language cannot be applied in a wooden and
mechanistic fashion any more than, Mr. Justice Black to the
contrary, section 8(b)(1)(A) can be said to prohibit in all instances
that which clearly restrains and coerces the union member-the courtenforced fine. One might assume that the union would be justified in
expulsion and requiring payment of dues even where section 7 rights
are asserted in some circumstances. After all, insofar as section
8(b)(1)(A) is concerned, union fines which did not run afoul of the
statute were instituted to smother the section 7 right to refrain from
the union strike and the picket line involved in Allis-Chalmers.
Ironically, the leading potential example of a case where a section
8(a)(3)(B) and section 8(b)(1)(A) allegation could be dismissed despite
the fact that section 7 activity was involved will fit the facts of
McGraw itself. Might not those misbehaved workers at union
meetings be sponsoring a rival union or decertification movement and
hesitating on the brink of filing a petition with the Board? Such
members would pose substantial hazards to the union and its
campaign to keep its incumbent status; behavior at the union
meetings would, in effect, constitute just the tip of the iceberg. This
possibility is the reason why both the Board and the courts have
permitted the expulsion of such members under the statute. But
161. The problems involved in balancing competing interests in other contexts are not new to
the Board. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957);

NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). But see NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). On the section
8(a)(3)(B) proviso itself see NLRB v. Zoe Chem. Co., 406 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Local 50, 339 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,382 U.S. 827 (1965).
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McGraw makes the choice more difficult. If such employees
voluntarily refuse full membership to begin with, the Court's holding
in General Motors would require them to assume the same financial
burden as full members. On the other hand, if they become a "Trojan
horse" and voluntarily assume full membership status to permit them
to create havoc within the union, their discipline removes them from
the burdens which General Motors would otherwise sanction. The
principle of McGraw is sound, but the holding's application to the
facts of that case is in error.
The most difficult problem presented by McGraw centers on the
task of defining an impairment of membership rights for section
8(a)(3)(B) purposes. One must recall that membership in McGraw
was not "denied or terminated" as the statute provides; it was
impaired through temporary suspension. But the Board wisely did not
draw hyper-technical distinctions since the purposes of section
8(a)(3)(B) are similarly defeated if the union can safely suspend where
it cannot expel or exclude-the same objectives of political
emasculation would be achieved. But what of black industrial union
members whose political rights are effectively impaired because most
whites will not vote for blacks, the white leadership will not sponsor
blacks for fear of the potential political consequences, and-especially
on an international union level-blacks are outvoted in each
geographical district or region. 1 2 For instance, the United
Steelworkers' executive board has no black members even though the
membership is at least 30 percent black.11 The best possibility for an
immediate breakthrough in this area is the appointment of a Negro
board member at large as occurred in the UAW in 1962.1" Today, the
white leadership generally refuses to budge even in most unions with a
large black membership.
The Board's decision in General Motors indicates that where the
union is not an "open" one or violates the duty of fair representation
in other respects, financial support cannot be compelled.'" However,
General Motors has not been utilized even with regard to the role of
the duty of fair representation in relation to the elimination of
discriminatory employment conditions. For instance, only 1.3 percent
162. See Gould, Black Workers in White Unions,THE NATION, Sept. 8, 1969, at 203.

163. See Loftus, Steel Union Gets a Rebuke on Race, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1968, § 1,at
23, col. 1. See generally Gould, supra note 92.
164. See Gould, supra note 162, at 204.
165. 133 N.L.R.B.451, at456-57 n.12.
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of General Motors' 52,000 journeymen are non-white; yet the matter
was hardly discussed, if at all, in the 1970 negotiations. The UAW's
proposal for "inverse" seniority to benefit junior black workers was
quietly dropped far in advance of the November settlement. The
United Steelworkers not only refuse to demand the elimination of
discriminatory seniority systems; they also fight a rear guard battle in
the courts for their preservation. And the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, with black employees constituting more than 10 percent
of its membership, does not seem particularly interested in breaking
down seniority lines which fence out Negro workers from the more
lucrative "over the road" jobs. In each of these instances, it seems
likely that black workers, taking a cue from the dicta in General
Motors, would be justified in refusing to pay the burdens of
membership until they receive the benefits. While my own preference
is for union security arrangements and strong, responsible trade
unionism-a characteristic often encouraged by such
clauses-enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation and the duty
of fair representation through self-help techniques overrides most
other policies.
I
What about the denial of full political involvement described
above-in effect a kind of de facto exclusion from policy-making
positions and a resulting effective impairment of membership rights?
Both the bondage and institutional racism historically practiced in the
United States make the position of the Negro worker relatively
unique.'" With the possible exception of women, most other ethnic
and occupational groups cannot claim protection on the basis of the
same historical pattern of discrimination. Yet the mere statistical
absence of blacks from leadership positions does not establish a basis
for nonpayment of dues.167 Rather, blacks must show that an
affirmative willingness to run for office, involve themselves in
slatemaking, and press for the appointment of blacks or other racial
minorities to important positions inside the .union have all met with
failure at least in part because of the obduracy of whites. Both AllisChalmers and the Court's decision in IA M v. Street1 s quite properly
166. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); cf. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,396 U.S. 903 (1970).
167. But it may establish a prima facie case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 40 (D. Ark. 1969), rem'dfor
judgment, 433 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1970).

168. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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require that the dissidents affirmatively establish an evidentiary basis
for their interest and identify the objective which they seek to
effectuate through litigation. In Allis-Chalmers and Street, they
sought disengagement from aspects of the union's political process. In
the instant case, the objective is the minority group's effort to share
responsibility with others.'
The failure of the union to establish a civil rights department to
attend to the special interest of blacks will buttress the finding of an
exclusion inconsistent with an intent to represent all members fairly.
The Board takes heed of the same cohsiderations in determining
whether a skilled occupational group is adequately represented by an
industrial union, 1 0 but the difference is that the skilled workers can
sever themselves from the bargaining unit and establish their own.",
Presumably, Negro workers do not have the same option, even when
they are grouped together in the same classifications or occupations,
since a demand for racially separate units would be contrary to both
public policy and statute.172
While the union should be permitted to rebut the presumption of
de facto exclusion and duty of fair representation deficiencies
established by racial statistics, it should not sustain its burden merely'
through the establishment of a separate civil rights department. More
important to this end would be a good faith effort to elect a racially
balanced slate as leadership vacancies occur. Certainly no individual's
election can be guaranteed, and the Landrum-Griffin Act has
encouraged the election as the proper means through which union
officials achieve their position.7 3 But as a practical matter,
endorsement on the slate by the leadership is, in many unions,
tantamount to election. Thus, while the union could rebut the
presumption established against it through a good faith effort, it is
not obligated to produce the actual election of Negro officials. A good
169. 1 am not advocating exhaustion of remedies before refusal to pay dues may be begun.
Where there was a pattern of exclusion by whites inside the union, exhaustion at the time of
nonpayment would be an exercise in futility. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393
U.S. 324 (1969). Discussion of exhaustion and the applicability of Gloveris contained in Gould,
supranote 96; Gould, supra note 92.
170. General Motors Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958).
171. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
172. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
Query, however, might not a black caucus insist upon the same kind of separate ratification
rights as the skilled trades have obtained for themselves in the UAW?
173. Cf. S. LiPsET. M. TROW'& J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956).
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faith effort would most often produce election, but there is always the
possibility that the white rank and file might vote down both the
17 4
black candidate and the white leaders who sponsored him as well.
All of this is, of course, a substantial extension of the impairment
of membership rights involved in McGraw. But, as we have seen, that
case itself represented a quantum jump from the language of section
8(a)(3)(B). If a more passive but equally pernicious impairment is to
be eradicated in the area of race relations in employment, the
application of McGraw advocated here should be adopted, for
nothing will make the unions move more quickly than a threat to their
treasuries. The essential danger imposed by such a
remedy-nonpayment of dues-may make it easier for the unions to
explain to a hostile white membership why blacks are being endorsed
on the slate for higher office. Moreover, a more integrated leadership
can exert greater pressure on the employer to change discriminatory
working conditions.
The only form of union security arrangement which is clearly
unlawful per se is the closed shop. 75 The Court has held that the
encouragement of union membership and consequent enforcement of
a de facto closed shop which may flow from the union hiring hall do
not necessarily constitute unlawful discrimination."7 Moreover, the
courts and the Board have held that section 8(b)(2)17 discrimination
necessitates a direct approach by the union to the company, and the
Board has held that employer discrimination cannot be found when a
discharge is made pursuant to closed shop by-laws if the element of a
union approach cannot be shown."7 Scofield, however, has said that
174. However, it is possible to guarantee election by a plan. See United States v. Local 189,
United Papermakers, Civ. No. - (E.D. La. 1968) (consent decree; unreported); Daye v.
Tobacco Workers Union, 234 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1964); Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, 57
L.R.R.M. 2227 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
175. See generally Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Glasser v. NLRB,
395 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1968); National Ass'n of Orchestra Leaders, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 75
L.R.R.M. 1418 (1970); International Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949), enforcement denied, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951).
176. Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964):

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ....
to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a

condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
178. The cases are collected in Comment, Closed Shop Union Bylaws Under the NLRA. 37
U. Cni. L. Rav. 778 (1970). See also S. LipsaT, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, supra note 173. ,
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the question whether section 8(b)(1)(A) violations are present depends
upon the extent to which union rules obstruct the overriding policies
protected by federal labor law. 7' Thus, Scofield seemingly dictates the
conclusion that employer reliance upon closed shop rules regardless of

a direct union approach, as well as the internal maintenance and
enforcement of such rules, interferes with an overriding policy basic to
the statutory scheme and violates section 8(b)(1)(A). Moreover,
closed shop practices which have retained vitality on a de facto basis
in the United States may constitute a violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 19641se where their effect is to exclude racial minorities.'81 .
PREREQUISITES FOR THE LEVYING OF UNION FINES

DemocraticProcedures

Although the Court in Allis-Chalmers stated that the question of
the enforceability of union fines was not new, many employees are in
fact not aware that a fine may be imposed for misbehavior. The
Board has yet to speak on this matter, but several trial examiners'
opinions have already held that a union has a duty to put the worker
on notice concerning the potential existence of an obligation
enforceable by fine and the amount of money that may be involved. 18
179. 394 U.S. at 429-30.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
181. See Comment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Minority Group Entry Into the
Building Trade Unions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 328 (1970). Moreover, it would appear that Scofeld
would make unlawful a union assessment upon black workers-not imposed as a condition of
employment-to finance the litigation costs of Title Vii cases instituted by the black workers
themselves. Such action might violate Title VI I as well since Negroes and other minorities are
deterred from filing suit by the double payment involved and the increased resentment of white
workers. Cf. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Presumably, if there was a tradition of financing litigation from periodic dues, this would be
proper. See note 160 supra. But here again, black workers should be free to resist payment for
such expenditures. See IAM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Smigel v. Southgate School Dist. 74
L.R.R.M. 3080 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
182. The Board has passed over this issue without comment in Local 35, Am. Newspaper
Guild (Washington Post Co.), 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1970), and
Communication Workers, Local 6222, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 75 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1970), even
though the trial examiner had dealt with the issue in both cases. This approach is contrary to the
clear line of authority which imposes a fiduciary duty upon the union to make known to the
employee the full extent of his obligation under a union security agreement and to immunize a
worker from discharge when this has not been done. See NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters, 401
F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 213 (1969); NLRB v. Hotel, Motel and Club
Employees Union, Local 568, 320 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1963); International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 936
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This approach conforms with the concern for procedural niceties
expressed in Allis-Chalmers. The proper time to advise the employee
about such an obligation is either before or at the time the strike vote
is taken. Each individual can then weigh for himself the economic
consequence of loss of wages against. the monies which may be due
the union through fines.
Noting that two-thirds of the members of each local had voted
by secret ballot to strike and that the UAW had approved the
strike,e the Court concluded in Allis-Chalmers that the union
procedures were "democratic" and thus presumably in accord with
the general intent of the Landrum-Griffin Act which sponsored "requirements of adherence to democratic principles [and] fair proceddures .. ."184
But suppose no vote is held and, indeed, the union constitution
does not contemplate the calling of one. Presumably, if a union
official orders the stoppage without a vote, one may be confronted
with the "fiat" which Allis-Chalmers seemed to condemn. But
suppose that the strike is ordered, takes place, and that a subsequent
vote ratifies the union official's action. May not the membership as
well as union officials ratify action already taken? One of the
difficulties, of course, is that workers may begin to cross the picket
line between the times of the instructions and the vote. Should one
permit the fine to be assessed on a prorata basis-as was done for the
resignee in Boeing-binding the member for his conduct during the
period of time subsequent to the vote? Arguably, this accommodation
might be inappropriate since the workers may have chosen sides at the
inception of the stoppage with the non-striker's response triggered, in
p4rt, by the arbitrary nature of the union's decision-making.
Perhaps union fiat or arbitrary conduct is present only when union
leaders directly thwart the expressed wishes of the members through
defiance of a majority vote against the strike. But suppose that the
constitution or custom dictates that the vote is not binding or is
without effect. A union may require a two-thirds vote or something
(1962); Aerojet-General Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 75 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1970); Bulk
Transportation, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 75 L.R.R.M. 1463 (1970); August Busch Co. &
Teamsters, Local 122, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 194,69 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1968); Granite City Steel Co.,
169 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 67 L.R.R.M. 1399 (1968). However, the union may insist that the dues
payment be prompt, General Motors Corp., Packard Elec. Div., 134 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1961), and
that higher initiation fees be imposed as a worker moves into a better paying job classification.
Aluminum Workers Trade Council, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 16,75 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1970).
183. 388 U.S. at 177.
184. Id.
at 195.
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more than a majority to strike.' If the majority votes to strike, but
the two-thirds requirement is not met, does the union violate section
8(b)(1)(A) in fining strikers?
These complications may eventually lead to the view that the
Allis-Chalmersemphasis upon fair and democratic procedures was an
unwise one. For instance, how does one determine what is a majority
vote? One can assume that the Board will focus attention on what
constitutes the majority of those voting, rather than the entire group
of workers in the voting unit.' But what is the appropriate group for
voting? The trend in local union organization, in part prompted by the
enactment of Landrum-Griffin reporting requirements,'" is toward
amalgamated locals which deal with a large number of plants and a
wide variety of bargaining situations. Does a requirement of a
majority vote in an amalgamated local, while only one plant is
involved in the strike situation, satisfy the Allis-Chalmers majority
rule requirements? What if a majority of the workers in the plant are
in conflict with the total amalgamated vote?
Some of these issues are raised by the Board's decision in Rocket
Freight Lines Co.188 Rocket's collective bargaining relationship
related to both the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and three'
of its local unions; there was no Board certification of an appropriate
unit. While the company chose not to attend so-called "national"
conferences which included participation by the International in
negotiation of a new master agreement, local conferences were
arranged. The company did not participate with other employers in a
multi-employer relationship at the latter conference.
The Teamsters' by-laws require employee ratification as a
condition precedent to formal execution of the collective bargaining
agreement. While employees in the three local unions voted to approve
the contract, the International disapproved, and a strike which had
185. In England the Heath Government's Consultative Document and Industrial Relations
Bill have been criticized because of their provision for a majority ballot in "emergency" strike,
while some union constitutions require a two-thirds vote. See Torode, Carr's Package, NEW
STATESMEN, Oct. 9, 1970, at 446. See also Castle, The Bad Bosses' Charter, NEW STATESMEN,
Oct. 16, 1970, at 477-78.
186. This would be in line with voting in Board-conducted certification elections under
section 9. New York Handkerchief Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 704 (1940).
187. See generally W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY (1959); Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,58 MICH. L. Rv. 819
(1960).
188. 176 N.L.R.B. No. 94,71 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1969).
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started prior to the vote continued. Eventually the International did
approve, the strike was terminated by the locals, and a contract was
signed.
The trial examiner found that both the employer and the
employees knew that no contract could take effect until it was
approved by the international union. Thus, he rejected initially the
company's argument that a collective agreement was in effect and
that fines imposed upon employees who crossed the picket line were an
attempt to induce such employees to engage in unprotected and
unlawful activity. More specifically, the company also contended that
the local employee ratification vote should be binding and that to
permit the union to fine employees for refusing to strike, when a
majority of the employees had already ratified the agreement, was
inconsistent with the democratic procedures emphasized in AllisChalmers. But this argument ignores the fact that the international
union has a vital interest on the impact of a contract package upon
union members outside the unit immediately affected. Moreover, the
Board has specifically held that conditioning the execution of a
contract upon approval by the international union is not an unlawful
refusal to bargain.'
Ignoring the relevant language in Allis-Chalmers, the trial
examiner in Rocket FreightLines ridiculed the company's argument
as one which holds that
fundamental principles of democracy demand that the employee ratification
vote pre-empt[s] all other considerations, that it is somehow unfair, not nice,
undemocratic, for any group of union officials or for distant parent
organizations to frustrate the will of a single bargaining unit majority, in this
fashion.'"

Accordingly, the trial examiner dismissed the company's complaint,
and the Board affirmed without comment.
The Tenth Circuit denied a petition for review."' Avoiding the
broad issue posed by the employer-whether international authority
to approve the contract contravened the principles of industrial
democracy contemplated in Allis-Chalmers-the court limited its
consideration to the question whether a contract had in fact been
189. E.g., Morgantown Glass & Mirror, 177 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 71 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1969);
Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962); Capital Transit Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 169 (1953).
190. 176 N.L.R.B. No. 94,71 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1969).
191. Rocket Freight Lines v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970).
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consummated. Finding that the contract had not been in existence
until the international union had given approval, the court held
therefore that the picket line was not unlawful. Accordingly, on the
authority of Allis-Chalmers, the court approved the disciplinary
action taken by the union against the workers who crossed the picket
line.
I am of the view that tensions exist between the Court's concern
with internal union democratic procedures in Allis-Chalmers and an
earlier decision, NLRB v. Borg Warner,92 upon which the trial
examiner had relied in the Rocket Freight Lines case. Borg.Warner,
decided prior to the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, held that a
management proposal that a union not be permitted to strike without
an employee ratification vote was non-mandatory subject matter
about which the employer was precluded from bargaining to impasse
and that employer insistence upon such a clause was an unlawful
refusal to bargain under the Act."3 The theme of Borg Warner was
that the employer proposal in question undermined the principle of
exclusivity inasmuch as it purported to require the consent of
individual employees who had already exercised their choice by
selecting a bargaining representative. Thus, reasoned the Court in
Borg Warner, such a proposal was inconsistent with the basic
assumptions of the Act. To some extent, this analysis is consistent
with Allis-Chalmers. Both decisions stress the importance of
exclusivity. But insofar as the internal affairs of a union are
concerned, Allis-Chalmers makes this consideration directly relevant
to the question of whether a violation can be found. The thrust of
Borg Warner is to place internal democratic procedures--or the lack
of such-beyond the domain of the NLRA. In effect, the Court said
in Borg Warner that employee support for the union was tantamount
to adherence to union policies and that management might not project
itself into a potential disagreement between the workers and the
union.
Where a strike is not based on an employee vote but stems simply
from the "fiat" of a union leader, one can assume under AllisChalmers that the labor organization involved runs a strong risk of
violating section 8(b)(1)(A) by disciplining strikebreakers. But the
facts in Rocket Freight Lines are a bit different. Here there was a vote
192. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

193. Id. at 349; cf.Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
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which was subject to International approval. The employees thus
had an opportunity to express their views on the economic package
presented, albeit subject to an accommodation between such
expression and what the international union officials thought was
best. This practice is in accordance with that of most international
unions, and nothing reasonably suggests that Allis-Chalmers implied
its disruption. The views of the workers are voiced through the vote.
Union leaders must pay heed to such views or they may find themselves out of office or replaced by a new bargaining representative.'"
One should not suggest that all qualifications imposed upon
employee views can be sustained under Allis-Chalmers. For instance,
suppose the votes of the workers who will be forced to strike are
diluted by others in an amalgamated union. The situation becomes
even more troublesome when the majority is outside the plant and
perhaps outside the industry of the workers who will have to strike if
the vote is in the affirmative. In this situation, the Board's principal
consideration should be directed to determining whether the vote is so
diluted as to render it entirely meaningless. Where those who will
strike are in a small minority, the situation approaches something
akin to union "fiat" with or without the necessity of approval from
union officials. Where the statistical question is a close one-perhaps
where the striking voters constitute as little as 50 percent of the
voters-the question should be whether the workers outside the union
have any direct community of interest with those inside. That is to
say, the focus of inquiry should be whether both the benefits and the
burdens of the strike decision are directly felt by those who participate
in that decision. I would venture to say that where participating voters
are in a different industry, such proof would be difficult to produce.
But, if in the automobile industry, for instance, the UAW members at
all of the Big Three took a vote to strike General Motors rather than
adopting the normal practice of an authorization to strike any of the
three, the community of interest would be stronger, and thus the
procedure proper under A llis-Chalmers.1 5
Although this detailed balancing both in terms of the numbers of
employees involved and their relationship to one another promises to
present a very difficult task of line-drawing, the attention given to
194. Cf. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958); Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B.

823 (1945).
195. See the authorities concerning coordinated bargaining cited in note 65 supra.
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democratic procedures in Allis-Chalmers would seem to command no
less. Moreover, it might be said that the alternative-which is to turn
a blind eye toward this area-would provide the employee with less
freedom of choice and make more convincing Mr. Justice Black's
"plain meaning of plain words" dissent in Allis-Chalmers.
Finally, one other issue which does not surface clearly in Rocket
Freight Lines remains for discussion. Suppose that a majority of the
workers demonstrate their disagreement with the union policy by
returning to work despite union orders to the contrary. It is quite
unlikely, of course, that the union would want to impose financial
penalties upon such a large number of its members or even to expel
them if a rival union is waiting in the wings. But assuming that the
union wished to do so, it might seek to rely on those cases which
question whether a walkout is as unprotected as a "wildcat" strike,
cases which emphasize the number of workers participating.",
However, this approach places too heavy an emphasis upon rewarding
strikebreakers where employers have substantial power. The number
can change depending upon the time of the count."' Moreover,
acceptance of this view would lead to the conclusion that a union
which calls a strike to demand more protection against layoff of'
relatively junior black workers would be unable to fine its majority
white work force whose unenthusiasm for the issue makes it
impossible for them to "hit the bricks" for very long."'
A slightly more difficult issue is posed if the union is beaten so
badly in the strike that it loses majority status altogether. The
relevance of this factor is dramatized by the Court's emphasis in
Allis-Chalmers upon the peculiar relationship between the union's
status as exclusive bargaining representative, the statutory obligation
to represent all fairly, and the right of unions to discipline. Certainly
much of the dicta in Allis-Chalmers would indicate that a union
without such status is deprived of the need for disciplinary authority
which was upheld in that decision. As a practical matter, the union's
loss of majority status is more likely to appear where the employer is
196. See Sunbeam Lighting Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1962), enforcement denied, 318 F.2d
661 (7th Cir. 1963). But see NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Vogue
Lingerie, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1959).
197. This happened in Sunbeam. See Gould, The Status of Unautho~lzed and "Wildcat"
Strikes Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 698-700 (1967).

198. The UAW proposed a form of "inverse seniority" to the auto manufacturers. The plan
was aimed at benefitting junior black workers but was dropped long before the final settlement.
See Orr, U.A. W. Asks Inverse Seniority, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 12, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
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lawfully able to discharge union supporters since even those strikers
who have been permanently replaced could vote in a decertification
election 1" and thus increase the possibility that the union will retain
its incumbent status. My judgment is that the union's central interest
in pursuing strike objectives and its claim upon those who have
participated until skies began to cloud, coupled with the lawfulness of
a "member only" contract which is not dependent upon majority
status in an appropriate unit,2 argue strongly for ignoring the dicta
in Allis-Chalmers. Moreover, since the Board has held that an
employer may challenge an incumbent union's majority status in
certain circumstances through the filing of a representation petition as
well as a refusal to bargain which is litigated as an unfair labor
practice,"'1 confusion on the part of both the union and employees
would be accentuated where the employer chose the latter, more timeconsuming procedure. Finally, the uneasiness with an application of
the Allis-Chalmers dicta to this problem is compounded by the fact
that the employer's victory in a refusal-to-bargain charge might not
clearly establish that the union in fact lacked majority status at any
time" or that the union lacked majority status at the critical time at
which the fine was imposed.
The Reasonablenessof the Amount

Assuming that the fine may be imposed, is there a limit upon its
amount? For if the fine is enforceable and the amount is substantial,
union deterrent power becomes enormous. On the other hand, the
union has a very direct interest in seeing that nonstrikers do not profit
while strikers are deprived of their wages and in assuming that no
substantial economic premium is involved in being a nonstriker. The
question whether the reasonableness of the fine is open for the Board
to consider is prompted by the reference in both Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield to the "reasonableness" of the fines in those cases. However,
the Scofield opinion is somewhat ambiguous on the question whether
reasonableness refers to the amount of the fine or to the objective
which the union seeks to implement.
199. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
200. See Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 29 (1962); cf.Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
201. United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966).
202. NLRB v. Gulfmount Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Terrell Machine
Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 230,70 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969), enforcement granted, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th
Cir. 1970).
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In Boeing, Trial Examiner Donovan concluded that a reasonable
fine constituted 35 percent of the nonstrikers' earnings based upon a

regular work week and 80 percent of overtime hours at premium pay,
the latter being work which the nonstrikers would not normally have

performed were it not for the strike.m The difficult balance is between
protecting the union's interest in effectuating deterrence while, at the
same time, guarding against total deterrence in order to preserve the
right to refrain. For instance, if the worker's fine amounted to his
total wages or even what he would have received had he been on strike

and been paid strike benefits, deterrence is almost total. Few
employees will work for nothing, and the fine imposed would create
that result. On the other hand, some have suggested that a reasonable
fine should deprive the nonstriker of the benefits that are obtained
through the new contract which the union negotiates. 2°4 The difficulty
presented by the suggestion is twofold: first, calculating the worth of
the package may be extremely difficult, particularly when it requires
involving legal institutions; more importantly, this legal rule would
come close to creating two classes of employees for a union which has
an obligation to bargain for all employees-non-union as well as
union-in the bargaining unitm and could build the differentiation
203. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1006 (1970).
204. [E]ven if a nonstriker is allowed to protect hi mself from losing his job, he should not
be permitted.to avoid the loss of income that the majority suffered in its effort to extract
better terms from the employer. Thus, the union should be allowed to collect a fine so
long as the amount does not exceed the pay received by a nonstriker during the walkout
(less any strike benefits he would have been eligible to receive from the union). Some
observers would object to this reasoning, arguing that the minority should not be forced
to accept even a temporary loss of wages during the strike. This argument goes very far to
protect the individual at the expense of majority interest. By even putting this problem
aside, the union can make the further point that individuals should not be able to eat their
cake and have it, too, by escaping-the burdens of the strike while sharing in the benefits
that are eventually won. Under this approach, the union could legitimately force
nonstrikers to pay any amount not exceeding the value of the added benefits achieved by
the strike. Of course, there are practical problems in measuring these benefits. It may be
unclear just what the employer would have offered had the dispute been settled on the eve
of the strike. Nor can one know if a lost strike may eventually bear fruit thereby making
the union's threats more credible in future negotiations. Despite these complications,
most cases could be resolved easily enough by allowing the union to fine nonstrikers,
provided that the amount collected does not exceed the income the members would have
lost by striking or the added benefits they will receive over the terms of the new agreement
as a result of the walkout. By adopting this data the court would do no more than respect
the legitimate claims of the majority against the worker who refuses to walk out with his
fellow members. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 106-07
(1970).
205. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,47 (1954).
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directly into the workers' employment status through depriving one
group of the benefits of the collective agreement.

In Arrow Development Co.2 the Board avoided these problems
by holding that it is not empowered to examine the severity of

otherwise lawful discipline. After reviewing the three Supreme Court
decisions in this area, the Board continued:
Given this precedent, particularly the holding of the Supreme Court that

Congress did not, by enacting Section 8(b)(1)(A), undertake to regulate union
fines (or court enforcement of same) imposed on members for their failure to
honor an authorized picket line, we cannot conclude that Congress nonetheless
intended to have the Board regulate the size of these fines and establish
standards with respect to their reasonableness. Indeed, as the legal
enforceability of these fines is grounded in contract theory, it is obvious that
the local courts are the more logical tribunals for the establishment of
standards of reasonableness ....

.. Such considerations [of reasonableness] are of an equitable nature
rather than of the character of restraint and coercion with which the National
Labor Relations Act treats."

Former Chairman McCulloch dissented, concluding that where
the fine was enforced by court action rather than by expulsion or
suspension from union membership, the Board was obligated to
examine the question of reasonableness. According to his dissenting
opinion, a court-enforceable fine which was greater than the wages
earned by the nonstrikers during the strike constituted a total restraint

on the right to refrain under section 7. In Member McCulloch's view,
the economic effect of such a fine was to assess a worker on wages
earned after the strike was over when the union no longer needed

protection. Moreover, Member McCulloch pointed out that the
Board, under section 8(b)(5), 201 already had a duty to determine the
206. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970). Accord, Local 488, UAW, 185
N.L.R.B. No. 126, 75 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1970); Communication Workers, Local 6222, 186
N.L.R.B. No. 50, 75 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1970); Uniroyal, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 75
L.R.R.M. 1420 (1970); Washington Post Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1438
(1970); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 75 L.R.R.M. 1441; cf. Local
101, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 199,75 L.R.R.M. 1421
(1970).
207. Arrow Development Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22,75 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1010 (1970).
208. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1964) provides that
(b) [i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ....
(5)
to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsection (a)(3) of
this section the payment, as a condition precedent to becoming a member of such
organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory
under all the circumstances. In making such a finding, the Board shall consider, among
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reasonableness of a union's initiation fees in assessing whether their
amount is "excessive and discriminatory under all the
circumstances."
But since the Board has held that in appropriate circumstances
employers may promise to pay the union fines to induce potential
strikebreakers to return to work or defy other union instructions,2" it
would appear that both the employer and nonstriker already possess a
measure of protection against the union. This factor, coupled with the
uncertainty about what is unreasonable, buttresses the Board's
reluctance to enter the quagmire of reasonableness and
unreasonableness. It would be better to wait for more definite
instructions from the Court on what was intended by the language of
Allis-Chalmers and Scofield. Moreover, the more substantial union
interest is to protect the strikers against permanent replacement and
the terrors of the MacKay rule, 2 0 not against profit-making by the
nonstrikers. In part, the Board has undertaken this task through
limiting the rule's scope. 21 And if the employer is in a position to
nullify even "reasonable" union fines, some of its interests are
other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular

industry, and the wages currently paid to the employees affected.
See also NLRB v. Television and Radio Broadcasting Studio Employees Local 804, 315 F.2d

398 (3d Cir. 1963); Ferro Stamping & Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1951); New Orleans S.S.
Ass'n, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 75 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1970); National Ass'n of Orchestra Leaders,
165 N.L.R.B. 798 (1967); National Broadcasting Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 242 (1967); Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 1430 (1952); Local 153, UAW (Richard Stacker),
99 N.L.R.B. 1419 (1952).
209. See Standard Plumbing & Heating Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 75 L.R.R.M. 1065
(1970), where the Board stated that "we further agree with the Trial Examiner on the basis of
the record testimony, that Respondent Standard's offer to pay the fines of employees who might
be fined by the Union did not violate Section 8(a)(l) in the circumstances of this case." Id., 75
L.R.R.M. at 1066-67. Accord, Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 75 L.R.R.M. 2542 (D. Minn.
1970). Query, however, may the employer who is entitled to file charges for the employee provide
him with counsel? Do the Landrum-Griffin prohibitions against such assistance apply to the
NLRA? Cf. Leeds & Northrup Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1965); Barney Wilkerson Constr. Co.,
145 N.L.R.B. 704 (1963).
210. See NLRB v. MacKay Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), which permits an employer to
permanently replace economic strikers. For additional discussion of this matter, see Note,
Replacement of Workers DuringStrikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966).
211. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enforcement
granted, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), where the Board held
that economic strikers who unconditionally applied for reinstatement at a time when their
positions were filled by permanent replacements remain employees and are entitled to full
reinstatement upon the departure of the replacements unless they have in the meantime acquired
regular and substantially equivalent employment or unless the employer can sustain th: burden
of proof to establish that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for "legitimate and
substantial business reasons."
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protected vis-a-vis nonstrikers in the bargaining unit. The employer
would retain the option of hiring temporary replacements which
would have the effect of making the struggle turn on the respective
economic strengths of the parties as well as intangible human

relations considerations.2 12 Since the union itself has initiated the
combat through the imposition of the fine, it seems difficult for it to
argue that the employer's promise of payment or actual payment is
identical to a situation where management unlawfully undercuts the
union through promises of benefits to employees who will break the
2 13
union's picket line.

Section 8(b)(1)(B): The Rights of Unions to Fine Supervisors
Section 8(b)(1)(B) states that it shall be an unfair labor practice

for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce "an
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of
214 The
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances ....
leading case interpreting this provision is Northwest Publications,
Inc.215 where the Board prohibited fines levied by the union against

foremen members because of disagreements between the union and
employer about contract interpretations or grievance adjustments.
The Board distinguished Allis-Chalmers, stating that that case did

not involve direct interference with the labor-management
212. Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
213. The solicitation of individual strikers to take action in derogation of their exclusive
representative is unlawful under the Act. Samuel Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612
(1948). But cf. NLRB v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1948); The Texas Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); United Welding Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 954 (1947); Times Publishing Co., 72
N.L.R.B. 676 (1947). Allis-Chalmers, in stressing the fact that "weak unions" would be
disadvantaged if court-enforced fines were to be held violative of section 8(b)(l)(A), seems to run
counter to a view which would permit the parties to exert their respective economic strength to
the best of their abilities. In this respect, Allis-Chalmers is itself at Variance with much of federal
labor law as defined by the Supreme Court. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970);
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1964). See generally NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters 279
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1960); NLRB v. ILGWU, 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960); S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1947).
215. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 252, 69 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1968). See also NLRB v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 49, 75 L.R.R.M. 2062 (10th Cir. 1970); Safeway Stores, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 130, 75 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1970); Lonie and Son, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 75 L.R.R.M.
1336 (1970); Grinnell Co. of the Pacific, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 74 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1970);
Houston Shopping News Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 74 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1970); Kockos Bros.,
183 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 74 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1970); A.S. Homer, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 105,
71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969).
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-relationship as such and, moreover, that section 8(b)(1)(B) did not
contain the proviso which is attached to section 8(b)(1)(A). Of course,
the existence of the proviso was not critical to the Court's conclusion
in Allis-Chalmers although it did provide "cogent support." In AllisChalmers the Court was primarily concerned with an assessment of
the language "restrain or coerce"-language which is applicable to
section 8(b)(1)(B) as well as section 8(b)(1)(A). Therefore, the mere
failure of Congress to attach the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(B) does not
establish the conclusion that a union's internal affairs are to be
excluded from consideration. After all, violations are found under
section 8(b)(1)(A) despite its attached proviso. All that can fairly be
said about section 8(b)(1)(B) is that the union may have less latitude
than under subsection (A).
The Board, in Toledo Blade Co., 216 has held that a union violates
section 8(b)(1)(B) when it fines supervisors for violating, during a
strike, contractual provisions concerning the amount of production
work that can be performed by a supervisor and regulations regarding
the minimum crew required before work can be done. Subsequently,
in one of the Homer cases, 217 the Board found a violation of section
8(b)(1)(B) where fines were imposed on a supervisor who hired nonunion carpenters on the job and signed a company letter sent to
employees urging them to vote against the union in a representation
218
election.
What union discipline, then, is proper and lawful because it does
not affect the foreman-member in his supervisory capacity and
therefore does not coerce and restrain the company as such? In
dismissing a section 8(b)(1)(B) charge where the supervisor was fined
for not complying with union registration requirements, the Board
has affirmed trial examiner language to the effect that a union does
not violate section 8(b)(1)(B) by fining "any supervisor for whatever
reason, including, for late payment of dues or disruption of the union
meeting .... ,,21
The critical question is whether the conduct which
the union seeks to restrain through a fine is essential or critical to the
supervisory function and therefore within management's nonrestrainable rights under section 8(b)(1)(B).
216. 175 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969), enforcement granted, 76 L.R.R.M.
2422 (6th Cir. 1971).
217. A.S. Homer, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 71 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1969); A.S. Horner, Inc.,
176 N.L.R.B. No. 105,71 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969).
218. A.S. Homer, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 76,71 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1969).
219. Syd Gough & Sons, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 24, at 4,74 L.R.R.M. 1539 (1970) (TXD124-70) (Quoted language deleted in L.R.R.M. report).
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But suppose one applies the Allis-Chalmers fact situation to
section 8(b)(1)(B). Is it possible to find a violation for fining
strikebreakers where management employs strikebreaking
supervisors who perform production work? On the one hand, one
might say that the case resembles those situations where supervisors
have taken a different position on contract interpretation and assigned
or performed work which the union contended should properly be
given to others. But here the situation seems to be somewhat different. If, as the Court said in Allis-Chalmers, the union has a substantial interest in disciplining strikebreakers, that analysis ought not to
be altered simply because they happen to be in the supervisory positions. The thrust against the union as an institution and against its
strike function is just as direct and effective.
A finding of a violation should be easier to make out where the
supervisors were simply performing their normal maintenance
functions and thereby not supplanting the strikers themselves.
Moreover, the same conclusion would follow where the strike itself
was unlawful or unprotected, just as the Board has distinguished such
cases involving employees from Allis-Chalmersitself. But, under the
above-noted hypothetical, section 8(b)(1)(B) is not violated. The
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that supervisors who remain union
members are most often obtaining additional benefits. Frequently,
they have remained members in order to retain possession of
withdrawal cards which will make it less expensive for them to reenter the trade or another plant under union jurisdiction. Under the
Allis-Chalmers rationale, this would seem to indicate a pledge of
allegiance by the supervisor and therefore should be deemed consent
by such an individual to render himself liable to financial obligations
where the union's interest is direct and where the conduct engaged in is
somewhat distant from basic supervisory functions. If the employer is
unduly harmed by such a rule, it seems to me that its obligation is to
make the supervisory position financially attractive enough for the
supervisor to forego the benefits of union membership and to resign.
PREEMPTION

In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,220 a
worker claiming that his expulsion from membership in the IAM
violated his rights under the constitution and by-laws of the union
220. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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-brought suit against both the international and local, together with
their officers, in a California state court. In response to his prayer for
relief, the court ordered the reinstatement of the worker and awarded
him damages for lost wages as well as physical and mental suffering.
The question for decision was the extent to which state jurisdiction
was excluded by the doctrine of preemption as applied under the
National Labor Relations Act.
Speaking for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
noted that the union did not dispute the fact that California had
jurisdiction to order the remedy of reinstatement for wrongful
expulsion from union membership.
The crux of the claim sustained by the California court was that under
California law membership in a labor union constitutes a contract between the
member and the union, the terms of which are governed by the constitution and
by-laws of the union, and that state law provides, through mandatory
reinstatement and damages, a remedy for breach of such contract through
wrongful expulsion. This contractual conception of the relationship between a
member and his union widely prevails in this. country. .... 21

Conceding that denial of membership in conjunction with
employment discrimination might violate section 8(b)(2) of the Act,
the Court also noted the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso and stated that the
controversy involved the application of state law to union rules
regarding the retention of membership. Ouster of a state court from
its "traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights of
union membership," Mr. Justice Frankfurter cautioned, would often
leave workers without a remedy for restoration of this right. Since the
suit did not purport to involve discrimination in employment status as
such, the majority concluded that a more "compelling indication" of
preemption was required than was present in the instant case.
The year after Gonzales, the Court decided the landmark case of
2 Characterizing
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.m

Gonzales as a case presenting "peripheral" problems in terms of the
federal regulatory scheme, the Court held that where the conduct
221. Id. at 618. The reference by Justice Frankfurter is to the House of Lords' decision in
Bonsor v. Musicians Union [1956] A.C. 104.
222. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). On the preemption issue in labor-management relations, see
Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the
Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435 (1970); Cox, Federalism and the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rav. 1297 (1954); Gould, The Garmon Case: The Decline and
Threshold of Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DaT. L.J. 539 (1962); Isaacson, Federal Preemption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 391 (1958); Michelman, State
Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activity, 74 HARv. L. REV. 641 (1961).
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engaged in was arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by
section 8 of the Act, preemption precluded the exercise of state court
jurisdiction. However, in Local 100, United Association of Journeymen v. Borden,2 the Court dealt with a fact situation perilously
close to that of Gonzales and distinguished the latter case.
In Borden a member of the Shreveport, Louisiana, local
plumbers' union arrived in Dallas, Texas, to seek a job with the
Farwell Construction Company on a bank construction project.
Although no written agreement indicated an established basis for
hiring, it was generally accomplished through union referral. Borden
was unable to obtain a referral from the business agent of the
plumbers' union even after the agent had accepted Borden's clearance
card from the Shreveport local, and the employer had asked the
business agent to send Boston over. Apparently, the union suspected
that the employer had arranged to have Borden employed prior to his
arrival in Dallas and objected to this. As a result, Borden did not get
the job with Farwell although he was referred to, and accepted, several
other jobs before the bank construction project was completed.
Subsequently, however, he brought suit against the Dallas local and
the international seeking damages under state law for the refusal to
refer him to Farwell. Borden alleged that the defendants' action
constituted a willful, malicious, and discriminatory interference with
his right to contract and pursue a lawful occupation and that the
union had unfairly denied his right to work. Eventually, Borden
recovered a state court judgment based on the refusal to refer,
receiving compensation for mental suffering and punitive damages.
Disagreeing with the state court's view, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f it is assumed that the refusal and the resulting inability to . . .obtain
employment were in some way based on respondent's actual or believed failure
to comply with internal union rules, it is certainly "arguable" that the union's
conduct violated § 8(b)(1)(A)
. . .and § 8(b)(2). .

.

.[T]he lawsuit [in Gonzales]was focused on purely

internal union matters, i.e. on relations between the individual plaintiff and the
union not having to do directly with matters of employment, and
principal relief sought was restoration of union membership rightsY4

. . .

the

Thus, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to determine
the extent to which Garmon had qualified "the principles declared in
223. 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
224. Id. at 694, 697.
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,Gonzales with respect to jurisdiction to award consequential damages
. .

9" In Borden, said the Court, the focus was upon employment

status rather than internal union problems.
Awaiting review before the Supreme Court at present is a decision
of the Supreme Court of Idaho which attempts to examine the
tensions between Gonzales, Garmon, and Borden. In this case,
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge,m the employee had worked for the
Greyhound Corporation since 1945, was continually a member of the
union, and was employed by Greyhound until November 2, 1959.
Around November 12, 1959, Lockridge was informed that his
membership in the union had been terminated and that the union had
requested Greyhound to terminate his employment. Greyhound
complied with the union's request, and Lockridge sought relief in the
state courts.
Initially the Supreme Court of Idaho noted that Lockridge was
not subject to suspension or dismissal from the union for nonpayment
of October dues since the contract clause upon which the union based
its dismissal request provided for suspension of members not in good
standing, and Lockridge was not in that category. In response to the
preemption issue, the Supreme Court of Idaho rationalized state court
jurisdiction since Lockridge had attempted from the outset of the
litigation to regain membership.-2 Since the relief requested involved
both damages and equitable relief, jurisdiction was retained even
though the only basis for computing damages was the loss of
employment which had ensued from implementation of the union
security provision of the contract. Thus, despite the fact that
employment status was involved as in Borden, the Idaho court relied
primarily upon Gonzales on the theory articulated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in upholding state court jurisdiction-namely, that the
Board could not order restoration of membership status.
Accordingly, the case was remanded for "restoration of respondent's
seniority rights in the union" and a final determination of damages
for loss of earnings.
What does all of this portend for state court jurisdiction over the
cases in which unions attempt to enforce fines in such tribunals? The
Supreme Court specifically noted in Allis-Chalmers that the ques225. Id. at 697.
226. 93 Idaho 294,460 P.2d 719 (1969), cert. granted,397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
227. Id. at _, 460 P.2d at 725.
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tion of preemption was not before it, citing both Gonzales and

Borden.m But in Scofield, Mr. Justice White said that
[u]nless the rule or its enforcement impinges on some policy of the federal labor
law, the regulation of the relationship between union and employee is a
contractual matter governed by local law. As the trial examiner put it in this
case, the Board "never intended. . . to suggest that the disciplinary action[s]
in enforcement of [union] rules. .,were affirmatively protected under the Act,
as opposed to merely being not violations thereof." It is thus a "federally
unentered enclave" open to state law.m9

Moreover, the Court in Allis-Chalmers relied upon a tradition of state

court enforcement of union fines to sustain its interpretation of union
rights under the NLRA. m Therefore, one might conclude that this

subject matter is the kind which, while it may be preempted under a
strict reading of the Garmon test, is nevertheless not preempted

because of the strong local interest and tradition of state court
jurisdiction.? 1 This conclusion is buttressed by a number of factors:
first, the Court's retention of state court jurisdiction in duty-of-fairrepresentation cases since the obligation itself had been judicially
articulated prior to the emergence of the preemption doctrine under

Garmon; second, the broadest preemption cases, particularly

m 2 have been justified because the
involving the secondary boycott,2

Congress was thought to have affirmatively intended self-help to
apply where regulation was not imposed-and the proviso to section

8(b)(1)(A) is easily analogized to this; finally, where an alleged breach
of the collective bargaining agreement is presented-as in Lockridge
228. 388 U.S. at 197 n.37.
229. 394 U.S. at 426 n.3. Accord, UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 76 L.R.R.M. 2433 (Wise.
Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1971).
230. See, e.g., Walsh v. Communication Workers Local 2336, 75 L.R.R.M. 2629 (Md. Ct.
App. 1970); North Jersey Guild Local 173 v. Rakos, 74 L.R.R.M. 2487 (N.J. Super. Ct., App.
Div. 1970); Ballas v. McKiernan, 74 L.R.R.M. 2647 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); Local 248, UAW v.
Natzke, 36 Wise. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602 (1967). But see United Glassworkers' Local 188 v.
Seitz, 399 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1965), which holds that there is a presumption against judicial
enforcement of the union constitution unless it provides to the contrary. See generally
Summers-Legal Limitations.
231. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); UAW v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v.
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). But.see Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959);
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric & Railway Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v.
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950);
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
232. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). See also Weber v. AnhauserBusch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953)..
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and some of the union fine cases2 3-the Court has held that section
301 jurisdiction for federal and state courts is not precluded by the
preemption doctrine.?
Yet, the Court was persuaded in part in the duty of fair
representation cases by its fear that the individual's rights might be
smothered by a broad doctrine of preemption, particularly since the
General Counsel of the Board appears to have plenary power in
deciding whether an unfair labor practice complaint should issue. M
But this consideration is not present here since the union, not the
individual, is the party bringing suit. Protection of individual rights
might well dictate, in this instance, a broad doctrine of preemption in
order to protect workers against state court jurisdictions which might
be unsympathetic to individuals' rights.26 This seems to be warranted
by the broad regulation of the union discipline area which has been
enumerated above. But to date, the Board, over former Chairman
McCulloch's strong dissent, has relied upon the dicta in AllisChalmers concerning the tradition of state court jurisdiction and
adopted what Chairman McCulloch has called a "reverse preemption
doctrine."1 At the same time, it must be noted that the Board's
statements were made in the context of determining whether the'
National Labor Relations Act permitted it to assess the
reasonableness of the fine. Perhaps the proper accommodation is one
which would stay the state court's hand where the subject matter is
arguably covered by the section 8(b)(1)(A) cases but, where no
violation has been found by the Board, would permit the state courts
to inquire into questions such as the reasonableness of the fine.m This
may provide a sensible balance in an area where state court
jurisdiction has a firm tradition and yet where, ironically, AllisChalmers-which looked to that history in order to reach its
conclusion in favor of the union position-has involved the Board in a
host of union fine questions.
Still, Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, and Marine Workers all stand for
the general proposition that the presumption in most cases must be
233. See Teledyne Wis. Motor v. UAW, 75 L.R.R.M. 2472 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); cf. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Union v. Svacek, 75 L.R.R.M. 2427 (9th Cir. 1970).
234. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
235. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). This is a principal theme in Mr. Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion in United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. at 698.
236. But see cases cited at note 167 supra.
237. Arrow Development Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22,75 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1013, (1970).
238. See note 167 supra.
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made in favor of the lawfulness of union behavior. Perhaps this
factor, coupled with a strong tradition of local enforcement, may
argue conclusively for acceptance of the "reverse preemption
doctrine" against which former Chairman McCulloch warned. More
important, however, is a consideration of remedy. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Stewart have expressed their
disenchantment with Garmon.23s A concurring opinion of the Chief
Justice clearly indicates that one of his concerns with a broad
preemption doctrine consists of the possible absence of remedy which
it engenders. 2' 0 In the cases upon which Chief Justice Burger focused,
involving the application of Garmon to trespass disputes, the
employer may be limited to self-help since, if the state court
jurisdiction over conduct is preempted, only the union or employee
can trigger a resolution of the issue through the filing of an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board.2 1 In the union fine cases, the
employee must file the charge alleging "restraint" and "coercion"
with the Board. But if state courts are ousted of jurisdiction, the
incentive to file is reduced in the fine cases, and the union is without
a remedy. This is not like the case of expulsion where the sanction has
the effect of banishing the worker from his trade or livelihood. Here,
the employee will take legal action with the Board or state courts, the
latter forum being vigorously utilized in Gonzales, Borden, and
Lockridge.

Finally, of course, the lack of an expansive damage remedy
provided by the Board gives the employee an incentive to sue in state
court. Perhaps the Board or Congress should take a hard look at this
matter and, adopting Chief Justice Burger's approach, rule in favor of
state court jurisdiction. Yet if Allis-Chalmers and its progeny indicate
anything, they suggest that questions of union discipline imposed
upon individuals cannot be separated from labor-management
239. Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201-02 (1970).
240. Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227 (1970). See Broomfield, Preemptive
FederalJurisdictionOver ConcertedTrespassory Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REv. 552 (1970).
On the issues involved in considering union activity on company property generally, see Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); Gould, The Question of Union Activity on
Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1964).
24 1. See Broomfield, supra note 240; Note, State Regulation of Unprotected Union Activity:
Bypassing the "Arguably Subject' Test with NLRB Advisory Opinions, 70 YALE L.J. 441
(1961). The adoption of proposals like those put forward in the above-cited articles is a
prerequisite to any accommodation or solution.
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.relations policy. Damage actions -particularly in state courts where
local juries have parochial prejudices against labor or
management-are generally considered to have an abrasive impact
2
upon industrial relations.A
All these factors may argue for the division of authority between
the Board and state courts advocated above in a field in which the
Board is deeply involved. If the Board has primary jurisdiction, that
agency might resolve the question whether the penalty was lawful and
then remit the parties to state court. If no charge was filed with the
Board even after the state action was filed, the state court should have
jurisdiction to hear at least the reasonableness issue-and perhaps
more.=
Garmon should have substantial-but perhaps not
total -application. And as the facts in Gonzales, Borden, and
Lockridge indicate, the line between internal affairs and employment
status seems more often artificial than not. Preemption should not
turn on whether the member alleges deprivation of membership rights
or, alternatively, seniority-too often they are one and the same.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and-perhaps to a lesser
extent-the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Congress presumed that
segments of organized labor were not meeting their responsibilities in
remedying existing discrimination and denials of internal democracy.
This theme should permeate all of national labor policy. 24 ' Judgments
concerning the authority of unions to discipline under the National
Labor Relations Act cannot ignore the policies reflected in these
statutes as well as in the judicially-articulated duty of fair
representation.
But while specifically recognizing in Scofield that internal union
rules-other than those which involve use of National Labor
Relations Board facilities-may have an impact upon employment
status that is equally if not more devastating than a reduction of
wages or a deprivation of seniority, the Court has properly said that
the presumptions are not the same in regard to union discipline
generally. Indeed, it could not be otherwise if industrial peace is to
242. See the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren in UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634,
647-59 (1958).
243. See Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, District 2, 382 U.S. 181 (1965); Retail
Clerks Union v. Scherrnerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
244. See Gould, supra note 96.
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remain a cornerstone of national labor policy. In that connection, the
courts may be called upon not only to tolerate a union's disciplining
of its members but also to compel such discipline.3 But particularly
Scofield, as well as Allis-Chalmers and Marine Workers, admonishes the Board not to abdicate its responsibility to limit discipline
which is offensive to public policy where penalties are involved. Unauthorized walkouts, or walkouts in breach of contract, and a refusal
to pay dues may constitute appropriate self-help which is a prerequisite to reforming the unions and which therefore merits immunization from both employer and union discipline. The desired objective is to induce private parties-in this instance organized labor-to
put their own house in order without the necessity for sometimes
cumbersome judicial intervention. Some limitations upon union
discipline, radiating from Allis-Chalmers, can be of assistance in
this connection.
245. See REA Express v. BrotherhOod of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 74 L.R.R.M.
2436 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); cf Hanna, Brothers-in-Law,The Sunday Times (London), Aug. 2, 1970,
at 34, col. 1.

